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introduction
As attention to the threat of global climate change has increased in most parts of the world, 
national and sub-national governments have increasingly turned to market-based policies 
— principally emissions-trading and carbon-tax systems — to reduce emissions of green-
house gases (ICAP 2017; World Bank 2017). It is broadly recognized that well-designed 
market-based policies can be cost-effective in achieving aggregate emissions-reduction targets, 
and this has been validated by considerable accumulated experience. Some jurisdictions are 
exploring opportunities for linking their emissions-trading systems (ETSs), because linkage 
between regional, national, and sub-national policy instruments has the potential to further 
reduce costs.
In parallel, the Paris Agreement — developed over a decade within the UNFCCC regime — 
represents a breakthrough in multilateral efforts to address climate change. For the first time, 
an international agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions includes mitigation contribu-
tions from all of the major-emitting countries — and, indeed, a large majority of the countries 
of the world. Further, the Agreement includes a dynamic feature through which mitigation 
commitments can be strengthened over time.
The Paris Agreement includes provisions — in Article 6 — with the potential to support and 
leverage market-based emission-reduction systems implemented by regional, national, and 
sub-national jurisdictions. In fact, Article 6.2 provides opportunities for the exchange of miti-
gation units generated by non-market domestic policies, thus reducing the cost of mitigation 
across jurisdictional borders even in these cases. Article 6.4 has the potential to build upon 
the extensive experience gained from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 
and possibly develop a new form of emission-reduction-credit system for a world in which all 
countries have mitigation obligations.
While Article 6 thus has considerable potential to advance GHG-emissions reduction, a great 
deal remains to be done to elaborate the Paris Agreement before this potential might be real-
ized. The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements hosted a research workshop at Harvard 
Kennedy School on July 6, 2017, to discuss options for elaborating Article 6, the evolution 
of market-based systems, and how these two processes might best support each other. Partici-
pants included twenty of the world’s leading researchers focusing on market mechanisms 
and the Paris Agreement, coming from the disciplines of economics, political science, inter-
national relations, and law — and based in Europe, the Republic of Korea, and the United 
States. An agenda and list of participants is included at the end of this monograph.
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Workshop participants subsequently prepared the briefs that are included in this document.1 
The first, by way of background, examines lessons learned from implementation of ETSs. 
The other briefs are organized in three sections. The first section focuses on approaches to 
establishing international carbon price(s), crucial for developing broader multilateral carbon 
markets — especially in the context of the highly heterogeneous mitigation pledges character-
istic of the Paris-Agreement regime. This section proceeds to consider the range of heterogene-
ity in national mitigation pledges with which market participants must deal. It concludes with 
a specific example of linkage with the aviation sector.
The second section provides a detailed analysis of Article 6 and its potential elaboration path-
ways. The third section examines the development of China’s national ETS and prospects for 
linkage in East Asia, again in the context of the Paris Agreement.
Each brief provides a list of highlights in the form of key points, and a compilation of all of 
the key points is provided after this introduction. The briefs are designed to be readily acces-
sible — and, it is hoped, useful — to negotiators and policy makers, as they consider how 
to elaborate the Paris Agreement in order to realize its potential to effectively address global 
climate change.
The July 2017 workshop and this report build upon previous work by the Harvard Project 
on Climate Agreements, the mission of which is to identify — and effectively communicate 
— scientifically sound, economically sensible, and politically pragmatic public policy options 
for addressing global climate change.2 In particular, it builds upon a workshop examining the 
elaboration and implementation of the Paris Agreement more broadly, held in July 2016, and 
a subsequent publication similar in format to the current volume (Stavins and Stowe 2016).3 
The Harvard Project is grateful to the Harvard University Climate Change Solutions Fund for 
major support for both workshops and publications.4
Leading scholars from around the world have released 89 discussion papers through the 
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements. Robert N. Stavins, Director, and Joseph E. Aldy, 
former Co-Director, also published three edited volumes of research (Aldy and Stavins 2007, 
2009, 2010). In addition, the Harvard Project has organized numerous research workshops 
and policy roundtables at Harvard and around the world — including at all but one UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties since COP-13 in Bali — intended to advance scholarship on and 
1 The editors are grateful to Bryan Galcik for layout and design of the document and to Marika Tatsutani for editing the briefs.
2 See the Harvard Project website: www.hks.harvard.edu/hpca.
3 For a report on the July 2016 workshop, see www.belfercenter.org/publication/harvard-project-hosts-research-workshop-paris-
agreement.
4 Support was also provided by the Harvard University Center for the Environment, the Enel Endowment for Environmental 
Economics at Harvard University, and by BP.
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analysis of policy options for global climate change, and to facilitate communication with 
negotiators and policy makers about these options.5
The Harvard Project’s research has been one source of valuable guidance and options for nego-
tiators and analysts over the last decade. We hope that the current volume may also stimulate 
thinking during this crucial period when the Paris Agreement must be elaborated and eventu-
ally implemented.
Robert N. Stavins 
 Director
Robert C. Stowe 
 Co-Director
5 Research workshops have been held at Harvard University and internationally, in collaboration with leading research institutes 
focusing on environmental economics and policy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Venice and Milan); the Mercator Research 
Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (Berlin); the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and Interna-
tional Cooperation (Beijing); and Resources for the Future (Washington, D.C.) The Harvard Project has conducted numerous 
roundtables engaging researchers, policy makers, and stakeholders (advocates and leaders in business and non-governmental 
organizations), in Brussels, Washington, D.C., Canberra, Rome, London, Paris, Tokyo, Seoul, Mexico City, Beijing, and Doha 
— among other locations. The Harvard Project has conducted side events presenting the results of policy-oriented research at the 
Thirteenth (Bali, Indonesia), Fourteenth (Poznan, Poland), Fifteenth (Copenhagen, Denmark), Sixteenth (Cancun, Mexico), Eigh-
teenth (Doha, Qatar), Nineteenth (Warsaw, Poland), Twentieth (Lima, Peru), Twenty-First (Paris, France), and Twenty-Second 
(Marrakech, Morocco) COPs. At the COPs, Harvard-Project leaders have also held meetings with individual negotiating teams 
from over 50 countries.
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guide to abbreviations 
AAU assigned amount unit (mitigation unit denominating Kyoto-Protocol emis-
sions-reduction obligations, tradable through Kyoto’s international-emis-
sions-trading mechanism)
BAU business as usual (referring in this context to levels or quantities of future 
GHG emissions in the absence of additional policy interventions)
CA cooperative approaches (mechanism defined in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agree-
ment)
CDM Clean Development Mechanism (Kyoto-Protocol flexible mechanism — an 
emissions-reduction-credit system)
CER certified emissions reduction (mitigation unit of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism)
CMA Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for the Paris Agreement)
CO2 carbon dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (with no modifier, referring to the Convention’s legally-
constituted governing body; or, for example as “COP-23,” to one of the 
COP’s annual meetings)
CORSIA Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (ICAO 
emissions reduction scheme; see brief by Petsonk and Vinsonhaler)
EPA (United States) Environmental Protection Agency
ERU emission reduction unit (mitigation unit of the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint 
Implementation)
ETS emissions trading system (or “scheme”; also referred to as “cap-and-trade 
system”)
EU European Union
G20 Group of 20 (governments of major economies)
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization (see brief by Petsonk and Vinson-
haler)
IET international emissions trading (Kyoto-Protocol flexible mechanism)
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITMO internationally transferred mitigation outcome (see Article 6.2 of the Paris 
Agreement)
JI Joint Implementation (Kyoto-Protocol flexible mechanism)
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JCM (Japanese government’s) Joint Crediting Mechanism
MRV measurement, reporting, and verification
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution (national “pledges” submitted in 
support of the Paris Agreement)
NDRC (China’s) National Development and Reform Commission
R&D research and development
SBI (UNFCCC’s permanent) Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA (UNFCCC’s permanent) Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice
SCC social cost of carbon (see especially briefs by Joseph Aldy and James Stock)
SDM sustainable development mechanism (mechanism defined in Article 6.4 of 
the Paris Agreement)
TPS tradable performance standard
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VCS Verified Carbon Standard (a non-governmental organization that develops 
and applies standards and methods used extensively to design and assess 
CDM projects and projects in other offset regimes)
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the paris agreement
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides infor-
mation on the Paris Agreement, including status of ratification, at (and linked to):
 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php
The authentic legal text of the Paris Agreement, in the various official languages of the United 
Nations, is linked from the above page. The English version is at:
 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_  
 paris_agreement.pdf
The final, though not legally-authentic, text of the Paris Agreement, as embodied in Decision 
1/CP.21 of the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, is at:
 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf
The UNFCCC Registry of Nationally Determined Contributions, submitted by national 
governments in support of the Paris Agreement, is here:
 http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx
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compilation of key points
Background
Richard Schmalensee and Robert N. Stavins: Lessons Learned from Cap-and-Trade Expe-
rience
•	 Well-designed cap-and-trade systems have proven to be environmentally 
effective and cost-effective.
•	 Successful cap-and-trade systems have had accurate emissions monitoring, 
significant violation penalties, and high compliance.
•	 Banking excess emissions reductions has been an important source of cost 
savings, and price collars can reduce price volatility.
•	 The use of “complementary policies,” such as subsidies for renewables that 
aim to reduce GHG emissions under the cap, will generally raise the total 
cost of emissions reductions, reduce innovation incentives, and yield no 
net environmental gain.
Carbon Pricing and Linkage in a Heterogeneous Paris Regime
Joseph E. Aldy: Carbon Price Focal Points and Carbon Markets
•	 Shared perceptions about a salient focal point for the price of carbon can 
facilitate coordination.
•	 Given significant heterogeneity in the form and framing of mitigation 
pledges under the Paris Agreement, carbon price focal points could facili-
tate broader coordination in climate-change policy, such as through link-
ing.
•	 The social cost of carbon or the least-cost carbon price pathway to limit-
ing warming to 2° C could serve as focal points, although uncertainties in 
calculating either metric could undermine their salience.
•	 Carbon price focal points would enable countries to identify opportunities 
for linking their domestic mitigation programs.
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James H. Stock: Developing and Maintaining a Reference Value for the Social Cost of 
Carbon
•	  An internationally agreed upon target price of carbon would provide a 
benchmark for comparing the stringency of national and subnational miti-
gation policies. Both the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) and the price path 
necessary to achieve a 2° C warming target are plausible candidates for this 
target price.
•	 Perhaps more important than the choice of benchmark is the legitimacy of 
the resulting price, which in turn hinges on the legitimacy of the process 
used to obtain and to update that price.
•	 Criteria for a process leading to a benchmark carbon price that is viewed 
as legitimate include scientific integrity, transparency, openness, admitting 
and explaining uncertainty, the ability of research to improve the estimate, a 
formal updating process, and international ownership of the process. Inter-
national ownership does not necessarily mean ownership by the UNFCCC.
Ian Parry: Coordination through International Price Floors
•	 Growing pressure for international carbon-price coordination is likely as 
countries implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
•	 Coordination over a minimum, rather than uniform, price has some attrac-
tions and precedents.
•	 There are practical implementation challenges for price floor arrangements, 
though they are not insurmountable.
•	 Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement provides a potential vehicle for promot-
ing broad participation in price-floor arrangements.
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Brian P. Flannery: Establishment and Evolution of International Markets under the Paris 
Agreement
•	 The Paris Agreement provides for international markets by recognizing that 
nations may voluntarily cooperate to implement NDCs, exchange mitiga-
tion outcomes under their own authority, and utilize the new mitigation 
mechanism under the CMA.1 In practice, implementation remains to be 
determined, both domestically and internationally, and Parties’ views differ 
on key aspects.
•	 Going forward, international markets will confront evolving challenges as 
nations review and renew contributions in five-year cycles under the Paris 
Agreement.
•	 This creates challenges, not only in terms of establishing markets to allow 
and account for international transfers now, but — even more — for link-
ing markets over decades across multiple domestic jurisdictions, presum-
ably with increasingly ambitious pledges. If the past is any indication, 
the domestic priorities of cooperating nations may change as a result of 
unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances, and they are unlikely to share 
common motivations, timescales, and procedures for taking relevant deci-
sions.
•	 The complex mosaic of evolving national circumstances will make it 
difficult to provide the flexibility and credibility that would allow firms 
to incorporate international market mechanisms with clarity about how 
these mechanisms can be utilized strategically to address transformational 
change.
1 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
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Michael A. Mehling, Gilbert E. Metcalf, and Robert N. Stavins: Linking Heterogeneous 
Climate Policies (Consistent with the Paris Agreement)
•	 International linkage of regional, national, and subnational climate poli-
cies could play an important role in supporting the ramp up of ambition in 
NDCs over time and so contribute to the success of the Paris Agreement.
•	 Linkage has the potential to lower overall costs of mitigation, given the 
wide range of marginal abatement costs across countries, and also can lower 
administrative costs of compliance and help build political momentum, 
both of which can contribute to scaling up ambition.
•	 The bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogene-
ity of NDCs, which can pose challenges for linking. These challenges are 
not insurmountable, but will require thoughtful guidance for the effective 
operation of key provisions for linking in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
•	 Article 6 guidance can facilitate linkage by, among other things, provid-
ing clear definitions and principles for internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes (ITMOs), taking into account the heterogeneous nature of 
NDCs.
Annie Petsonk and Charles Vinsonhaler: Count It Once: Climate Mitigation under the 
Paris Agreement and CORSIA
•	 The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA), established by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) in 2016, authorizes airlines to use emission reductions originat-
ing outside the aviation sector to offset the emissions of international 
flights. The environmental integrity of both the 2015 Paris Agreement 
and CORSIA can only be vouchsafed if these reductions are not double 
counted.
•	 We identify scenarios for transfers of emission reductions from the 
UNFCCC-Paris-Agreement “world” to the ICAO “world,” and we propose 
rules to ensure these reductions are only counted once.
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Analysis and Elaboration of Article 6
Sue Biniaz: Analyzing Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement along a “Nationally” 
and “Internationally” Determined Continuum
•	 Like the Paris Agreement as a whole, Article 6 combines elements that are 
determined nationally with others that are determined internationally.
•	 Articles 6.2 and 6.4 have in common that they are voluntary — i.e., it is 
wholly within a Party’s national discretion whether to use either one.
•	 Otherwise, there is a significant contrast between these provisions, as well 
as among various aspects of Article 6.2:
•	  Article 6.4 is near the “internationally determined” end of the contin-
uum.
•	 Article 6.2 is near the “internationally determined” end of the contin-
uum with respect to accounting, while other aspects are left to be 
“nationally determined.”
•	 A Party is free to take on requirements beyond those under the Agreement.
Andrei Marcu: Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Structure, Interpretation, Possible 
Outcomes
•	 Little progress has been made in operationalizing the Paris Agreement and 
its Article 6 since COP-21, and it will be challenging, but not impossible, 
to produce a rulebook by the end of COP-24 in late 2018. This will require 
a focused approach by Parties, starting with their submissions ahead of 
COP-23, in late 2017.
•	 Parties need to consider whether issues must be negotiated in parallel 
(“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”), or whether some issues are 
so fundamental that it would be better to give them priority. The scope of 
Article 6.2, and the definition and quantification of ITMOs, are examples 
of issues that may require early resolution.
•	 Articles 6.2 and 6.4 provide Parties with alternatives for the governance of 
ITMOs. While the distinction between these articles, in terms of standards 
and governance, may blur over time, it is important that they remain avail-
able as distinct options for now.
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Axel Michaelowa: The Paris Market Mechanisms’ Contribution to Global Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation: Complementarities and Tensions between Article 6.2 and Article 6.4
•	 The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 market mechanisms may provide govern-
ments with access to less costly mitigation options than would be avail-
able domestically and therefore could provide an important incentive to 
increase the ambition of NDCs over time.
•	 There are, however, critical issues to be resolved if market participants are 
to have confidence in the new regime and the potential of the Paris Mecha-
nisms is to be realized. Among these:
•	 Additionality must be defined carefully in the Paris-Agreement 
context, especially if applied to policy instruments — in part through 
application of cost-benefit analysis.
•	 The Article 6.4 mechanism should build on the strengths of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), applying CDM rules and accept-
ing CDM projects and certified emission reductions (CERs) as far as 
possible.
•	 Resolution of these and other issues—and realizing Article 6’s potential—
depends heavily on formulating sound accounting rules and processes in 
the context of heterogeneous NDCs.
Michele Stua: A Transformational Club within the Paris Agreement: A Climate-Club 
Perspective on Article 6
•	 The operationalization of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is still incom-
plete, leaving windows of opportunity for alternative interpretations.
•	 For instance, it is possible to develop a legally sound interpretation of Arti-
cle 6 based upon the literature on climate clubs.
•	 Such an interpretation could lead to a harmonious understanding of Arti-
cle 6, significantly enhancing its potential usefulness in advancing the goals 
of the Paris Agreement.
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Alex Hanafi and Jakub Jozwiak: Accelerating Country Cooperation to Reduce Climate 
Pollution under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement
•	 Meeting the Paris Agreement’s ambitious emissions-reduction goals requires 
early, sustained, and significant global reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
•	 The Paris Agreement’s Article 6.2 recognizes the role that carbon markets 
can play in catalyzing deeper cuts in climate pollution.
•	 While internationally transferred mitigation outcomes must be accounted 
“consistent with” any guidance agreed by the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment, countries and sub-national jurisdictions need not wait for interna-
tionally-agreed guidance before transferring mitigation outcomes.
Focusing on Asia
Jackson Ewing: China’s Emissions Trading System in Context
•	 Beyond addressing global climate change, China’s national emissions trad-
ing system (ETS) is part of Beijing’s effort to forge a cleaner and more 
dynamic modern economy, and this context is essential when considering 
its future direction and effectiveness.
•	 While China’s national ETS launch will likely go forward in advance of the 
COP-23 negotiations in November 2017, continuing questions on cover-
age, allowance allocation, and compliance obligations are unlikely to be 
settled by then.
•	 Once launched, China’s ETS will be uniquely placed to pursue market 
integration efforts in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Its success will 
hinge on domestic capacity building and operational discipline, and the 
effectiveness of its international engagement.
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Valerie J. Karplus: Laying the Foundation for CO2 Emissions Trading in China
•	 China plans to launch a national CO2 ETS by the end of 2017, substan-
tially increasing the global share of greenhouse gases under carbon pricing.
•	 The capabilities required to support emissions trading — especially 
measurement, reporting, and verification of energy, emissions, and output 
data — remain unevenly developed and weakly coordinated across subna-
tional governments and enterprises within China.
•	 China’s staged approach involves strengthening emissions accounting prior 
to launching emissions trading, which will provide a strong foundation for 
domestic system expansion as well as an example for establishing emissions 
trading in other developing countries.
•	 Longer term, establishing high-quality energy and emissions data will be 
essential to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the system and to facilitate 
linkages with other systems.
Richard D. Morgenstern: China’s National CO2 Emissions Trading Program: A New 
Application of Tradable Performance Standards
•	 China’s new national CO2 trading program, scheduled to begin in late 
2017, differs in key respects from most programs operating in the West.
•	 An important design difference is the use of intensity- or rate-based trad-
able performance standards (TPS). Because these standards fix average 
rather than total emissions, they differ from more familiar command-and-
control or cap-and-trade mechanisms.
•	 This approach has obvious advantages in terms of adapting to economic 
changes, but it is also inherently more complex to administer.
•	 Critical implementation issues include allowance allocation, the division 
of responsibilities among different Chinese authorities, actual measure-
ment and verification of emissions and output, and the setting/adjusting of 
sector-specific benchmarks.
•	 Given these challenges, and given China’s decentralized environmental 
management framework and lack of a strong tradition of national data 
collection, it will be important to strengthen systems for third-party verifi-
cation, include incentives for accurate reporting, and provide for periodic 
program review and the flexibility to make modifications.
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Lawrence H. Goulder: Linking China’s Cap-and-Trade System with Other Systems: Key 
Challenges
•	 China is introducing what will be the world’s largest ETS.
•	 This ETS will take the form of a tradable performance standard, a structure 
that is different from most other national or regional ETSs.
•	 Despite the structural difference, there is potential for mutually beneficial 
gains from introducing trades of China-sourced emissions allowances on 
the international market.
•	 Linking China’s ETS with other ETSs would not be beneficial in the short 
term, however. Before the potential gains from linkage can be realized, it 
would be necessary to:
•	 improve the reliability of the data on China’s emissions reductions;
•	 achieve greater compliance;
•	 assure a level of policy stringency comparable to what is promoted in 
other countries.
Suh-Yong Chung: Forming a Northeast Asian Carbon Market under the Paris Agreement
•	 To develop a Northeast Asian Carbon Market, leaders in the region must 
build strong political momentum for their national climate-change agen-
das. This is possible if the formation of a carbon market is seen as a policy 
vehicle for developing major low-carbon projects, such as a regional super-
grid.
•	 In establishing a carbon market for Northeast Asia, it will be very impor-
tant to consider and reflect on the development of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, including the cooperative approaches of Article 6.2 and the 
Mechanism of Article 6.4.
•	 Domestic carbon markets in Northeast Asia are at different levels of devel-
opment. Therefore, flexibility in terms of participating stakeholders, market 
structure, and accounting rules is necessary to develop a carbon market at 
the regional level, as long as the regional market is compatible with Article 
6 of the Paris Agreement.

background
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Lessons Learned from Cap-and-Trade Experience
Richard Schmalensee 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Robert N. Stavins 
Harvard University
Key Points
•	 Well-designed cap-and-trade systems have proven to be environmentally 
effective and cost-effective.
•	 Successful cap-and-trade systems have had accurate emissions monitoring, 
significant violation penalties, and high compliance.
•	 Banking excess emissions reductions has been an important source of cost 
savings, and price collars can reduce price volatility.
•	 The use of “complementary policies,” such as subsidies for renewables that 
aim to reduce GHG emissions under the cap, will generally raise the total 
cost of emissions reductions, reduce innovation incentives, and yield no 
net environmental gain.
Basic lessons
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for cooperation among Parties to meet their collec-
tive GHG emissions-reduction targets, including through linkage. The simplest way for this 
to occur is by linking cap-and-trade systems, although linkage of heterogeneous policies, 
including carbon taxes and performance standards, is also possible in principle.1 Linkages 
between well-designed national (or subnational) cap-and-trade systems can lower global miti-
gation costs and improve the functioning of national markets.
In order to provide information to policy-makers about the key attributes of well-designed 
cap-and-trade systems, we reviewed the available evidence on seven important cap-and-trade 
systems that aimed at pollution reduction (Schmalensee and Stavins 2017). Perhaps the most 
significant lesson from three decades of experience with cap-and trade systems is that cap and 
trade has proven to be environmentally effective and cost-effective in a variety of settings. The 
more abatement costs vary among covered entities, the greater the superiority of these systems 
over traditional command-and-control regulation.
1 See brief by Mehling, Metcalf, and Stavins in this volume.
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A second key lesson is that all successful cap-and-trade systems have had accurate monitoring 
of emissions and non-trivial penalties for violations. The result has been high levels of compli-
ance. Because implementation of cap-and-trade systems generally involves little administra-
tive discretion, there are fewer opportunities to evade compliance by challenging administra-
tive decisions than under traditional command-and-control regulation.
Design elements
Well-designed cap-and-trade systems contain a number of features aimed at reducing unnec-
essary price volatility. It is important that final rules be in place before the first compliance 
period. Otherwise, initial allowance price movements may largely reflect changing expecta-
tions regarding those rules, thus serving no useful purpose.
In several systems, the ability to bank allowances for later use has been an important source of 
cost savings. While there are obvious problems with allowing borrowing of allowances (which 
accordingly has never been done), the ability to bank provides a margin of intertemporal flex-
ibility with positive economic and environmental consequences.
Changes in economic conditions can render caps non-binding (reducing incentives to invest 
in innovation) or drive prices to intolerable levels (risking political backlash). These problems 
can be mitigated by adding price floors and ceilings (that is, a price collar). The result is a 
hybrid, combining features of cap-and-trade and carbon-tax systems. (A carbon tax is equiva-
lent to a cap-and-trade system in which the ceiling and floor are equal.)
To implement a price floor, a central authority buys and retires allowances if the price falls 
below the floor. A ceiling is usually implemented by having a central authority issue incremen-
tal allowances if the price rises above some threshold. These elements, especially a price ceil-
ing, which eliminates a hard cap on emissions, may complicate linking cap-and-trade systems 
under Article 6.
Allowance allocation and use of revenue
Free allocation of allowances can be used to build political support, generally without compro-
mising the cost-effectiveness of the resulting system. Total social cost could be reduced, 
however, if allowances were auctioned and the proceeds used to reduce distortionary taxes. 
In practice, there is generally strong political pressure to earmark auction revenues to fund 
specific government programs, usually “green” programs, though sometimes these revenues 
are used for deficit reduction. (Revenue from carbon taxes has been much less likely to be 
earmarked for “green” spending.)
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Leakage and competitiveness
In the absence of a global cap-and-trade regime with equal allowance prices everywhere, 
producers of GHG-intensive products in high-allowance-price areas will become less compet-
itive, and production and emissions will tend to shift from those areas. The importance of 
these competitiveness and leakage effects will vary among industries and with each system’s 
geographic coverage. Competitiveness impacts can be mitigated by providing extra allow-
ances to vulnerable firms based on past production levels. In contrast, unconditional grants of 
allowances do not affect competitiveness because they do not affect marginal cost.
Interactions with other policies
Because of other market failures that affect GHG emissions, there can be a case for supple-
menting cap-and-trade systems with policies aimed at those failures — for instance, govern-
ment investment in climate-related R&D. But “belt-and-suspenders” regimes that involve 
so-called “complementary policies,” which target GHG emissions that are under the cap, have 
apparent political appeal. Examples include the low-carbon fuel standard in California and 
subsidies for renewables in the European Union.
Policies of this sort can have significant adverse economic and environmental effects. When 
they subsidize or require relatively expensive mitigation options (e.g., residential-scale solar 
generation), they raise total mitigation costs. Unless a price floor or ceiling is binding, those 
higher costs produce no environmental benefit. Moreover, by depressing the allowance price, 
they reduce incentives to invest in innovation that could otherwise reduce future mitigation 
costs and thereby make more ambitious mitigation programs possible. Depressed allowance 
prices may have political appeal, but they are generally not in society’s economic or environ-
mental interest.
A caution
The design of future cap-and-trade systems can benefit from three decades of experience with 
such systems in the U.S. and Europe. Most covered entities in those systems have been private 
firms, however, and it is not clear how cost-effective cap and trade would be when many 
compliance entities are state enterprises, as, for example, in China. In general, the design of 
cap-and-trade systems needs to take careful account of the economic, political, and adminis-
trative environments in which they will operate.
Reference
Schmalensee, Richard and Robert N. Stavins. 2017. “Lessons Learned from Three Decades 
of Experience with Cap-and-Trade.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 
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Carbon Price Focal Points and Carbon Markets
Joseph E. Aldy 
Harvard Kennedy School 
Resources for the Future
Key Points
•	 Shared perceptions about a salient focal point for the price of carbon can 
facilitate coordination.
•	 Given significant heterogeneity in the form and framing of mitigation 
pledges under the Paris Agreement, carbon price focal points could facili-
tate broader coordination in climate-change policy, such as through link-
ing.
•	 The social cost of carbon or the least-cost carbon price pathway to limit-
ing warming to 2° C could serve as focal points, although uncertainties in 
calculating either metric could undermine their salience.
•	 Carbon price focal points would enable countries to identify opportunities 
for linking their domestic mitigation programs.
Introduction
Carbon pricing has received increasing attention in climate-change policy design in recent 
years. By the end of 2016, about 40 countries and more than 20 cities priced carbon through 
cap-and-trade and carbon-tax policies (World Bank 2016). These domestic emission-miti-
gation programs reflect countries’ initial efforts to implement their emission pledges under 
the Paris Agreement. While these countries have advanced quite heterogeneous mitigation 
pledges, the emergence of carbon pricing highlights the potential for the price of carbon to 
serve as a focal point for mitigation action.
The Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling (1960) noted that shared perceptions about a salient 
focal point can facilitate coordination. Drawing from this insight, this brief describes some 
examples of potential carbon price focal points and highlights how they could enable coordi-
nation, such as through linking, of emission-mitigation programs.
Examples of carbon price focal points
The UNFCCC process does not reveal obvious focal points. In the 1990s, a country’s emis-
sions in 1990 could have served as a focal point. Since then, differentiation in the base years 
used to define emission targets and in the form of mitigation pledges clearly indicates that 
there is no consensus about a base-year-1990 focal point. This reflects one of the disadvantages 
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of a nationally determined approach to mitigation: the emergence of significant heterogene-
ity in the form and stringency of national pledges. Such heterogeneity, in turn, suggests that 
there could be value in employing a common carbon-price benchmark for assessing mitigation 
pledges, especially in the context of evaluating opportunities for linking mitigation programs.
Let me suggest two potential candidates for carbon-price focal points. First, the social cost 
of carbon (SCC) — that is, the monetized damage of an incremental ton of carbon dioxide 
emissions — would provide a benchmark for comparing the cost of domestic mitigation 
programs with their benefits. Second, the carbon price path for globally-cost-effective attain-
ment of a 2° C warming limit would provide a benchmark for an individual country’s actions, 
relative to the long-term goal set in the Paris Agreement. Each of these has the appeal of 
connecting individual country mitigation policies to global social welfare (in the former case, 
under certain assumptions) or cost-effective attainment of the Paris goal (in the latter case). 
These characteristics could enhance the salience and acceptance of these benchmarks as focal 
points. Before describing their potential use as focal points, however, let me acknowledge 
some potential limitations.
A shared understanding of either of these metrics as a focal point may be difficult to realize, 
given the uncertainties and value judgments associated with each. Long-term integrated assess-
ment models generate estimates of each type of metric. Uncertainty in the climate science and 
economics — in terms of the equilibrium climate sensitivity, damage functions, and cata-
strophic risk, as well as the potential role for adaptation and geo-engineering — influence 
estimates of the SCC (Aldy 2015; Metcalf and Stock 2017). Likewise, equilibrium climate 
sensitivity and technology uncertainty influence estimates of the 2° C least-cost pathway.
Value judgments can also influence these measures through the choice of discount rate and 
tolerance for risk, as well as whether to focus on domestic or global impacts. The wide range 
of estimates of the SCC — such as resulted from the scenario analysis conducted by the U.S. 
government in the Obama Administration and found in the broader academic literature — 
and the wide range of 2° C least-cost-pathway estimates in the IPCC AR51 scenario database 
— suggests that there may not be a common perception of either of these measures. This 
could undermine either’s salience as a focal point.
Using focal points in practice
Deviations between a country’s domestic carbon price — or the carbon price of a linked 
system — and the SCC or the least-cost 2° C price point to opportunities for policy learning 
and adjustment (Aldy, et al. 2016). In addition, a country could indicate that it is designing 
a domestic mitigation policy with a given carbon price as an input to its decision-making. 
For example, a country could state its plan to implement a cap-and-trade program expected 
1 Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2013. www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5.
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to deliver an allowance price equal to the SCC. Doing so would enhance the transparency of 
mitigation pledges and also facilitate consideration of opportunities for linking mitigation 
efforts across countries (Aldy and Pizer 2016).
A country interested in linking its domestic mitigation programs with those of another coun-
try could voluntarily disclose the carbon price that its domestic programs would target. It 
could indicate whether this carbon price reflects the SCC, the least-cost 2° C price, or another 
objective (e.g., one that accounted for local co-benefits of mitigating carbon dioxide [Parry, et 
al. 2014]). This would reveal a government’s preferences and values in its domestic program 
(Keohane and Victor 2016). A country could also specify two carbon prices — unlinked 
and linked price targets — analogous to unconditional and conditional mitigation pledges 
submitted by some developing countries under the Paris-Agreement framework.
A common focal point could facilitate efforts to identify opportunities for linking under two 
cases. First, consider governments that have an interest in linking their programs with other 
governments’ programs that have similar carbon prices. These governments may prefer to 
avoid large resource transfers and the creation of large winners and losers through linking. 
Instead, the linking serves to create liquidity and price stability across the linked programs. 
Two countries sharing this interest and employing a carbon price focal point could then move 
forward with linking while also coordinating the design of key elements of their programs, 
such as price collars and non-compliance fines, based on the focal point.
Second, governments may identify opportunities to link with programs with different expected 
carbon prices, because this could signal large gains from trade. Linkage in these cases may also 
create de facto side payments that could encourage more substantial participation by poten-
tial laggards. A carbon price focal point, such as the SCC, could serve as a guide for welfare-
improving links. If linked programs deliver a carbon price that is closer to the SCC than the 
price each unlinked market would deliver, then the linking increases social welfare. In a simi-
lar fashion, if linked programs deliver a carbon price closer to the least-cost 2° C price, then 
the linked effort is more cost-effective than the unlinked alternative.
A carbon-price focal point can facilitate coordination among domestic emission-mitigation 
programs and connect these domestic efforts with long-term global climate-policy goals. 
Employing such a benchmark promotes cost-effective implementation, enhances policy learn-
ing, and enables greater mitigation ambition over time.
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Developing and Maintaining a Reference Value for the Social 
Cost of Carbon
James H. Stock 
Department of Economics and Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University
Key Points
•	 An internationally agreed upon target price of carbon would provide a 
benchmark for comparing the stringency of national and subnational miti-
gation policies. Both the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the price path 
necessary to achieve a 2° C warming target are plausible candidates for this 
target price.
•	 Perhaps more important than the choice of benchmark is the legitimacy of 
the resulting price, which in turn hinges on the legitimacy of the process 
used to obtain and to update that price.
•	 Criteria for a process leading to a benchmark carbon price that is viewed 
as legitimate include scientific integrity, transparency, openness, admitting 
and explaining uncertainty, the ability of research to improve the estimate, a 
formal updating process, and international ownership of the process. Inter-
national ownership does not necessarily mean ownership by the UNFCCC.
Background
Market-based carbon prices provide a natural way to compare the stringency of mitigation 
policies across jurisdictions and across policies. Such relative comparisons need an anchor 
— a benchmark global carbon price that represents a desired or appropriate level of effort. 
Two leading choices for such a benchmark are the global value of the SCC and the global 
carbon price associated with achieving the 2° C target.1 Computing either benchmark requires 
making assumptions on topics about which very little is currently known: In the case of the 
SCC, the speed, impacts, and costs of climate change in the distant future; in the case of the 
2° C target price, the quantitative effect of GHG concentrations on temperature and the cost 
of energy technologies through the end of this century and beyond.
The uncertainty associated with computing either of these benchmarks, or others that might 
be proposed, inherently stems from the long time horizons of climate policy. This uncertainty 
1 The SCC is the monetized value of future benefits of reducing CO2 emissions today by one ton, discounted to the present; this is 
the “externality value” of emitting an additional ton of CO2 today, or at a specified future date. The 2° C target price is the carbon 
price path, typically a global carbon tax path, that elicits the switching to zero- and negative-emissions technologies sufficient to 
limit warming to 2° C, relative to the pre-industrial global average surface temperature.
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makes both concepts ripe targets for criticism. For example, in the United States, critics of 
climate policy have seized on the uncertainty associated with estimating the SCC to argue that 
very conservative values of the SCC should be used, or even that the SCC should be disre-
garded altogether for policy purposes. Of course, policy-making must always be conducted 
in an environment of uncertainty, and waiting until uncertainty is resolved can mean waiting 
until it is too late. But for international climate policy to have a useful benchmark carbon 
price, that carbon price needs to be recognized as institutionally legitimate.
Process criteria
One way for a reference carbon price to be accepted as a benchmark for formal interna-
tional comparisons is to have that price be the result of a process that is seen as intellectually 
and institutionally legitimate. To that end, I therefore suggest some criteria for a process to 
develop and maintain a benchmark international carbon price.
1. Scientific integrity. The estimate should incorporate the most recent scien-
tific knowledge. For technology-based calculations, this should include 
both technology cost estimates and economic knowledge about technol-
ogy adoption and innovation, as well as the most recent science on the 
climate system. For damages-based calculations, this should include the 
most recent knowledge about the climate system, damages, adaptation 
costs, and discounting.
2. Transparency. Scientific and modeling decisions need to be documented 
and publicly available. To the maximum extent possible, code should be 
public domain.
3. Openness. Providing formal opportunities for comment from stakeholders 
— academics not involved in the process, governmental units, and industry 
— and addressing those comments will build support for the process and 
understanding of the outcome.
4. Admitting and explaining scientific uncertainty. Pretending that a 
benchmark carbon price can be computed with precision is not a tenable 
position and doing so undercuts the credibility of a resulting benchmark 
price. Uncertainty can be communicated by avoiding false precision (the 
SCC is $40, not $42.25), by adopting ranges (the SCC is $35–$45), or by 
communicating conditional values (if it turns out that the transient climate 
response is only 1° C, the SCC is [], but if the transient climate response is 
2.5oC, the SCC is []).
5. Estimates can be improved by research. An important part of ensuring 
scientific integrity is ensuring that areas of uncertainty are researchable. A 
HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS » 33
process that is judgmental or politically driven does not produce research-
able topics. A process that is evidence-based and model-based provides 
researchable topics on the evidence and models.
6. Regular updates. Because ongoing research advances knowledge, the 
best scientific evidence will evolve. Thus the best scientific estimate of the 
benchmark carbon price will evolve. The process therefore needs to antici-
pate regular updates, for example on a five-year cycle, to keep pace with the 
science. In addition, institutional use of a reference carbon price needs to 
recognize that the reference price will evolve over time.
7. Joint ownership. For stakeholders to recognize the benchmark price as 
legitimate, the institutional process delivering that price needs to have 
international legitimacy, which points to an international agency taking 
the lead in coordinating the calculation. Ownership of the process does 
not mean that the computations need to, or ought to, be done in-house, 
but the process by which they are supported, reviewed, and adopted needs 
to have international legitimacy. Because the details of the carbon-price 
computation are technically difficult, an appropriate topic of discussion is 
what agency is the appropriate lead coordinating agency. In addition to the 
UNFCCC, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
have increasing expertise in the climate analysis area and might be appro-
priate lead agencies to run a benchmark-carbon-price process. Devolving 
responsibility for the calculation to an agency with technical expertise, but 
without operational responsibility for monitoring under the Paris Agree-
ment, could have certain advantages.
Which benchmark concept?
This discussion has treated the SCC and the 2° C price even-handedly. Indeed, both concepts 
have advantages and disadvantages. The SCC is the economist’s definition of the externality 
value of CO2 emissions; as such, the SCC gives future generations a price-based “voice” in 
today’s mitigation efforts. However, the SCC computation concerns relatively small reduc-
tions, which is consistent with valuing the 2025 reductions but not the larger reductions 
necessary in the longer term. In addition, computing the SCC requires making some assump-
tions on issues about which little is known, most notably the monetary value of damages in 
the distant future. Although the 2° C target price aligns with international outcome goals, 
computing that price requires projecting technology costs over the next century. Just in the 
past decade, experts and policy-makers have been surprised by the fall in the prices of oil, 
natural gas in the United States, and wind and solar, and have equally been surprised by tech-
nological problems in other areas, such as second-generation biofuels and carbon capture and 
sequestration. The task of projecting technology costs for a century is far more difficult.
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Given these challenges, an argument could be made for developing both the SCC and 2° C 
price concepts as reference prices. Whatever the conceptual choice, however, critical to its 
acceptance is having a process that is viewed as legitimate by governments and stakeholders.
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Coordination through International Price Floors
Ian Parry 
Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund
Key Points
•	 Growing pressure for international carbon-price coordination is likely as 
countries implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
•	 Coordination over a minimum, rather than uniform, price has some attrac-
tions and precedents.
•	 There are practical implementation challenges for price floor arrangements, 
though they are not insurmountable.
•	 Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement provides a potential vehicle for promot-
ing broad participation in price-floor arrangements.
Pressure for price coordination
The emissions prices consistent with NDCs—either explicitly in the form of carbon taxes and 
emissions trading systems (ETSs) or implicitly in the form of regulations and other incen-
tives—likely differ substantially across countries.
One reason is the substantial variation in the stringency of emissions pledges. For example, 
most G20 countries have specified percent emission-reduction targets but these vary between 
15 and 40 percent. Moreover, in some cases these reductions are relative to a historical year 
(either 1990 or 2005), while in other cases they are relative to business-as-usual (BAU) projec-
tions (i.e., emissions in the absence of mitigation measures) for 2030.1 The latter are generally 
less onerous as BAU emissions tend to grow over time.
A second reason is the substantial variation in the responsiveness of emissions to pricing 
across countries. Emissions tend to be more price responsive in heavy-coal-using countries 
like China, India, and South Africa, given that carbon pricing has a much larger proportionate 
impact on coal prices than for other fuels.
With unilateral action on NDCs, cross-country divergences in (explicit or implicit) carbon 
prices are therefore likely to increase over time, which should generate growing interest in 
price-coordination mechanisms.
1 See http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
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Price-floor arrangements
One promising coordination mechanism, which could be implemented as a complement to 
the NDC process, is a minimum-carbon-price agreement among a group of (preferably large) 
emitting countries. This arrangement would provide some protection against losses in inter-
national competitiveness from pricing for both participating and non-participating countries. 
(Indeed the agreement may also help non-participants raise carbon prices.)
Individual countries in the agreement, moreover, would have flexibility to exceed the floor, 
which might make sense for several reasons. First, a high carbon price can be in a country’s 
own national interest if it generates substantial domestic environmental benefits, most nota-
bly health benefits from better local air quality as carbon pricing reduces combustion of coal 
and other polluting fuels. It has been estimated, for example, that phasing in a $70-per-ton 
carbon price in China between 2017 and 2030 would save almost four million deaths from 
air pollution.
Second, high carbon prices may raise badly needed revenues, not least in countries where 
extensive informal activity hinders adequate revenue mobilization from broader fiscal instru-
ments. In India, for example, a $70 carbon price could raise revenues of over 3 percent of 
GDP.
Third, high carbon prices may also be needed in countries where implementing the agreed 
floor price would not be sufficient to meet their NDC commitments.
Precedents for carbon-price-floor arrangements include the federal requirement in Canada 
that provinces phase in a minimum carbon price of CAN $50 (US $40) per ton by 2022. 
More broadly, tax floor regimes are commonly used in trading blocs to counteract underpric-
ing from tax competition. For example, the European Union (EU) imposes tax minima for 
alcohol, tobacco, energy products, and value added tax.
Implementation issues
One implementation issue is the choice of instrument for meeting the price floor. Carbon 
taxes may be the most natural instrument. However, ETSs are also compatible with a floor, 
for example, by setting the cap to yield expected prices in line with the floor. Another option 
would be to employ the type of variable tax the U.K. imposes on emissions sources covered 
by the EU ETS, where the variable tax is designed to bring the combined (U.K. and EU ETS) 
charge up to a target level.
Another issue is the need to account for practical, country-specific circumstances, such as 
relief from carbon pricing for especially sensitive fuels or sectors, or reductions in pre-existing 
energy taxes motivated by domestic considerations that might partly offset the effectiveness 
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of direct carbon pricing. Nonetheless, it should be feasible to develop analytical conventions 
for measuring countries’ “effective” carbon prices taking country circumstances into account. 
Policymakers may then pledge to increase this effective price by a given amount, allowing 
them considerable flexibility (e.g., through setting higher prices for other fuels to compensate 
for price relief for a sensitive fuel).
A third issue is deciding the level of the price floor (or the required increase in effective 
carbon prices). One possibility is to set a floor equal to the “social cost of carbon,” that is, the 
estimated future global climate damages associated with an additional ton of CO2 emissions, 
though these estimates are contentious, even among economists, let alone countries.2 Alter-
natively, the price floor could be aligned with global prices consistent with warming targets, 
but again these are uncertain, and the estimated prices—around $40-$80 per ton by 2020 
for the 2° C target—are ambitious relative to the current global average price of around $1 
per ton. More pragmatically, the floor might be set based on catching up to an existing price 
established by an environmental leader, such as Canada.
Article 6.2
Some countries may have little incentive to join a price floor arrangement if they meet their 
NDC pledges with emissions prices well below the floor price. However, by recognizing inter-
nationally traded mitigation units, Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement provides a potential 
vehicle for encouraging their participation, as these countries can gain from exceeding their 
NDCs and selling the excess mitigation units at the floor price. Conversely, countries with 
stringent NDCs can also benefit from participation as international purchase of mitigation 
units at the floor price may help them meet their mitigation requirements at lower cost.
In short, carbon-price floor arrangements initiated by a small group of countries could 
conceivably encourage broad country participation over time (regardless of the stringency of 
countries’ NDCs) via Article 6.2, without the need to impose penalties on countries outside 
of the agreement.
2 See also the brief by James Stock in this volume.
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Establishment and Evolution of International Markets under 
the Paris Agreement
Brian P. Flannery 
Resources for the Future
Key Points
•	 The Paris Agreement provides for international markets by recognizing that 
nations may voluntarily cooperate to implement Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs), exchange mitigation outcomes under their own 
authority, and utilize the new mitigation mechanism under the CMA.1 In 
practice, implementation remains to be determined, both domestically and 
internationally, and Parties’ views differ on key aspects (Marcu 2016).2
•	 Going forward, international markets will confront evolving challenges as 
nations review and renew contributions in five-year cycles under the Paris 
Agreement.
•	 This creates challenges, not only in terms of establishing markets to allow 
and account for international transfers now, but — even more — for link-
ing markets over decades across multiple domestic jurisdictions, presum-
ably with increasingly ambitious pledges. If the past is any indication, 
the domestic priorities of cooperating nations may change as a result of 
unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances, and they are unlikely to share 
common motivations, timescales, and procedures for taking relevant deci-
sions.
•	 The complex mosaic of evolving national circumstances will make it 
difficult to provide the flexibility and credibility that would allow firms 
to incorporate international market mechanisms with clarity about how 
these mechanisms can be utilized strategically to address transformational 
change.
International GHG markets have been active for years, both under the Kyoto Protocol, and 
as a result of national and subnational programs that recognize mitigation actions taken else-
where (including some programs that link jurisdictions across borders). Two major constituen-
cies drive these markets: (1) nations seeking to satisfy international agreements and (2) firms 
(and other actors) with legally binding domestic obligations to mitigate emissions. Under the 
1 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
2 See also brief by Andrei Marcu in this volume.
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Kyoto Protocol, market instruments and processes (e.g., emissions trading, allowances, and 
credits from offset projects) were used by both constituencies.
Going forward, firms, especially, will need far more clarity than provided by NDCs regard-
ing domestic markets and how they may link to markets in other nations. For example, many 
nations have put forward NDCs that state objectives at a point in time rather than as a budget 
over time, and it appears unlikely that all relevant offset projects will share common, interna-
tionally recognized procedures or metrics.
Economists and some policymakers hope that markets will help minimize the effort and cost 
to achieve long-term mitigation goals. Although initial requirements are modest, achieving 
the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement will require transformational change on a vast 
scale in a relatively short period of time. For international markets to play an important role, 
policy and process must provide firms with credible yet flexible guidance to inform strategic 
planning on, for example, research and development, investments, divestments, mergers and 
acquisitions, and management of supply and value chains.
The Kyoto Protocol provided a moderately coherent basis for existing international markets, 
but it remains unclear how markets will work for nations with voluntary, renewable pledges 
under the Paris Agreement and for firms and other actors. Because of the “evolutionary” 
nature of the Paris Agreement, multinational firms will face the complexity of participating in 
international markets in a way that complies with national regulations (and internal audit and 
control procedures), under mixed criteria from multiple jurisdictions, and subject to regula-
tions and procedures that may be changing frequently, with a bewildering array of decision-
makers acting under different pressures, rules, and time frames in different jurisdictions.
Some argue that it is necessary (or desirable) for policies to provide long-term certainty for 
businesses to manage the transformation to a low-carbon future. However, events of the last 
few decades demonstrate that this is impossible. Unforeseen and unforeseeable events—
including natural disasters (e.g., tsunamis), breakthroughs or bottlenecks in anticipated tech-
nological change (e.g., fracking and the “hydrogen economy”), and the inevitable disruption 
brought about by changes in government through elections or otherwise—preclude long-term 
certainty. A major concern is that political and policy changes may alter or disrupt markets 
on timescales far shorter than the time horizon to plan, implement, and manage major invest-
ments in facilities and infrastructure. Nonetheless, it should be possible to provide clarity on 
ultimate policy intentions, and on the criteria and procedures to be used in updating national 
contributions under the Paris Agreement and in identifying the domestic obligations of firms.
To date most discussions of future international markets have wrestled with the challenge 
of establishing these markets now, in the emerging framework of the Paris Agreement and 
national regimes for initial NDCs. An interesting and perhaps more important issue will be to 
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consider options and design elements to guide their evolution over multiple cycles to review 
and update future NDCs. Parties to the Paris Agreement must confront complications arising 
not only from the Agreement’s five-year cycles, but also from the challenges inherent in coher-
ently linking evolving domestic markets and mitigation obligations given differences in legis-
lation and regulation across multiple jurisdictions, each with its own procedures, constraints, 
and timescales, including the possibility of lengthy legal challenges.
For insight into markets in the evolving mosaic world established by the Paris Agreement, it 
would be useful for analysts to move away from consideration of ideal, first best policies based, 
for example, on an economy-wide carbon price applied to all GHG emissions that is identical 
in all nations. While such ideal policies would indeed have many benefits, they are completely 
unrealistic and irrelevant, certainly over the next few decades. Key political actors are more 
concerned about the implications of control and distribution policies for their constituents 
than they are about satisfying some abstract, amorphous global community that plays little 
role in setting or implementing policy, or electing domestic officials.
In the real world, policies result in a mosaic of approaches depending on circumstances, 
priorities, and institutions in each nation. In the context of establishing and developing inter-
national markets in a setting of perpetual negotiation tied to five-year cycles under the Paris 
Agreement, linked national (and subnational) markets face a daunting challenge to maintain 
coherence. Taken together, the Paris-Agreement architecture runs the serious risk of creating 
chaos in efforts to implement stable and effective long-term international markets.
Academics, policy advisors, and firms should consider how international GHG markets can 
be designed to provide credibility and flexibility and thereby contribute to a coherent strategic 
framework for efficiently managing transformational change. Ideally this should involve not 
only research, but also dialogue among participants from government, business, academia, 
and other domains—from a variety of nations—to better understand the implications of 
choices and inform both analyses and policy design.
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Key Points
•	 International linkage of regional, national, and subnational climate poli-
cies could play an important role in supporting the ramp up of ambition in 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) over time and so contrib-
ute to the success of the Paris Agreement.
•	 Linkage has the potential to lower overall costs of mitigation, given the 
wide range of marginal abatement costs across countries, and also can lower 
administrative costs of compliance and help build political momentum, 
both of which can contribute to scaling up ambition.
•	 The bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogene-
ity of NDCs, which can pose challenges for linking. These challenges are 
not insurmountable, but will require thoughtful guidance for the effective 
operation of key provisions for linking in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
•	 Article 6 guidance can facilitate linkage by, among other things, provid-
ing clear definitions and principles for internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes (ITMOs), taking into account the heterogeneous nature of 
NDCs.
The Paris Agreement features a hybrid policy architecture, combining top-down elements 
for monitoring, reporting, and verification, and bottom-up elements, including NDCs.1 The 
Agreement has achieved a key necessary condition for ultimate success, namely adequate scope 
of participation, with participating nations accounting for approximately 97 percent of global 
GHG emissions.
1 The arguments in this brief are developed more fully in Mehling, et al. (2017). Citations to the relevant literature are provided 
there.
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The other key necessary condition for ultimate success of this new approach is adequate, 
collective ambition of the individual NDCs to put the world on a path toward achieving the 
global political target of limiting temperature increases to 2° C. A central question is how to 
provide a structure and/or incentives that will facilitate such increases in ambition over time. 
International linkage of regional, national, and subnational policies can be part of the answer.
A challenge is the substantial degree of heterogeneity that characterizes climate policies along 
three dimensions: types of policy instruments, levels of political jurisdictions implementing 
those policies, and types of targets. Our research examines such heterogeneity and identifies 
(a) which linkages are feasible; (b) of these, which are most promising; and (c) what account-
ing mechanisms would make their operation consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Why focus on linkage?
The major economic argument for linkage is cost effectiveness — the ability to achieve a given 
level of emission reductions at lowest cost. Since a major impediment to ambitious climate 
policy is concern about the cost of mitigation, any policy that can lower costs can also lower 
political resistance to ambitious policy. It has been estimated that international linkage could 
reduce the cost of achieving the emissions reductions specified in the initial set of NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement by 32 percent by 2030 and by 54 percent by 2050 (World Bank 
2016, 83, 86).
Linkage can be valuable even when the linking jurisdictions have similar carbon prices. Here 
the benefits are political and administrative rather than economic. The political benefits from 
linking policies may stem from providing a sense of momentum to which political supporters 
of climate policy can point and so build support. Since GHG emissions are a global pollut-
ant, no politician wants to appear to be acting unilaterally to control emissions. Linking with 
other jurisdictions is a tangible signal of a multilateral approach to the problem. There are 
also administrative economies of scale through linkage. Jurisdictions can share best practices 
in designing and operating emission control policies and so learn from each other. They can 
also share administrative and oversight costs and avoid costly duplication of control efforts.
Linkage and heterogeneous systems
The bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogeneity in the submit-
ted NDCs. In addition, it is important to consider the possible role of non-party states and 
subnational governments in the wake of the Trump election in the United States and the 
announced intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. We separate these heterogeneous 
attributes into three categories: policy instrument, political jurisdiction, and target. We divide 
our consideration of political jurisdiction into two types of heterogeneity: levels of govern-
ment engaged in the prospective linkage (regional, national, or subnational) and status under 
the Paris Agreement (Party or non-Party). Finally we focus on two types of target heterogene-
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ity: the type of policy-instrument target and the type of NDC target. Our research suggests 
that heterogeneity per se is not an impediment to linkage. But there is a role for guidance on 
the key provision in the Paris Agreement for linking—Article 6.2.
Priorities for effective Article 6 guidance
Guidance elaborated by the Parties should direct attention to those potential transfers that 
present meaningful risks to environmental integrity. This would include the potential for “hot 
air,” consideration of heterogeneous target types, differing base years among linking parties, 
and differences in degree of geographic coverage of NDCs and the resulting potential for leak-
age, among other factors.
Key issues when accounting for international transfers facilitated through Article 6 include: 
quantifying mitigation targets and outcomes; avoiding double-counting of emission reduc-
tions; and accommodating different metrics for, and vintages of, targets and outcomes.
In order to track and account for international transfers through Article 6.2, definitions, prin-
ciples, and accounting rules will be needed. Among the approaches that could be specified 
in guidance on Article 6 are: standards and procedures for quantifying mitigation outcomes 
(whether through carbon taxes, cap-and-trade instruments, performance standards, or other 
policy instruments); registry tracking of the transfer and use of ITMOs; guidance on NDC 
elements that would increase clarity; and guidance to move NDCs to greater consistency, such 
as with regard to assumed Global Warming Potential values. Guidance could also establish 
whether and how transfers to or from non-Parties (or subnational jurisdictions therein) can 
be accounted for.
Guidance on Article 6 also needs to focus on the nature and scope of ITMOs. One issue is the 
metric for ITMOs: Will there be a single common metric, presumably tons of CO2 equiva-
lent, or will there be multiple metrics, such as installed capacity of renewable power? This 
relates to a broader question of whether ITMOs will be, in effect, a single or multiple type of 
compliance unit.
As they negotiate the work program on implementation of the Paris Agreement, Parties have 
an opportunity to establish clear and consistent guidance for operationalizing Article 6. If 
they can set aside political differences and agree on a robust framework for ITMO transfers, 
they will not only avoid impeding future linkage of climate policies across jurisdictions, but 
could create an enabling context with common definitions and modalities. Such a harmonized 
set of parameters could help accelerate linkage and allow for broader and deeper cooperation. 
It could also enhance Parties’ ability to scale up the ambition of their NDCs and potentially 
foster constructive engagement between Parties and non-Parties, as well as subnational juris-
dictions.
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Key Points
•	 The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA), established by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) in 2016, authorizes airlines to use emission reductions originat-
ing outside the aviation sector to offset the emissions of international 
flights. The environmental integrity of both the 2015 Paris Agreement 
and CORSIA can only be vouchsafed if these reductions are not double 
counted.
•	 We identify scenarios for transfers of emission reductions from the 
UNFCCC-Paris-Agreement “world” to the ICAO “world,” and we propose 
rules to ensure these reductions are only counted once.
Two “worlds” of mechanisms
UNFCCC Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement seeks to achieve its mitigation aims through 
successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) offered by each Party. The Agree-
ment recognizes that, in implementing their NDCs, Parties may choose to pursue volun-
tary cooperation (Article 6.1).1 The Paris Agreement specifies that when using internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) toward NDCs, Parties “shall apply robust account-
ing to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting,” and that this shall be done 
“consistent with guidance adopted by the [CMA2]”, in the event the CMA adopts such guid-
ance (Article 6.2). The Paris Agreement also establishes, under CMA authority, a mechanism 
— to be supervised by a CMA-designated body under rules adopted by the CMA — to aim to 
contribute to the reduction of emission levels in a host Party that can also be used by another 
Party to fulfill its NDC and “deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions” (Articles 6.4 
and 6.7).
1 The text of the Paris Agreement is at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
2 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
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ICAO-CORSIA. ICAO was established in 1944 by the Chicago Convention on International 
Civil Aviation. ICAO’s 2016 Assembly established CORSIA to address any annual increase 
in total CO2 emissions above 2020 levels from flights departing one country that arrive in a 
different country. All non-exempted countries must participate from 2027 to 2035, and any 
country may choose to participate from 2021 to 2026 (ICAO 2016, pars. 5, 9–14). ICAO’s 
Council and its Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) are currently 
developing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and related guidance to support 
the purchase of appropriate emissions units by aircraft operators under CORSIA, for adoption 
by the Council as soon as possible but not later than 2018, taking into account developments 
in the UNFCCC and under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The Council will periodically 
review the SARPs and guidance to promote compatibility with future relevant decisions under 
the Agreement (ICAO 2016, par. 20).
Draft criteria for CORSIA’s eligible emissions units provide that offset credits for purchase 
by aircraft operators should only be “counted once towards a mitigation obligation” (ICAO 
2017, p. 18). Emissions units generated from mechanisms established under the UNFCCC 
and the Paris Agreement are eligible for use in CORSIA, provided that they meet criteria for 
avoiding double counting and for eligible vintage and timeframe (ICAO 2016, par. 21).
Two “worlds” of reporting
The Paris Agreement requires each of its Parties to regularly provide a “national inventory 
report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases” 
(Article 13.7 (a)). While the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement require Parties to report 
emissions from international aviation and international shipping, those are to be reported 
separately,3 and are not covered by NDCs.
To implement CORSIA, ICAO is developing SARPs that will require all Member States to 
require airlines to report the emissions of international flights (ICAO 2016, par. 16). If 
CORSIA SARPs also require reporting of emissions units cancelled by airlines to offset their 
emissions above 2020 levels, and if both types of reports are made public, ICAO Member 
States and the world will be able to see if CORSIA is working.
Count it once
Most emission reductions that could be used in CORSIA originate in the UNFCCC-Paris-
Agreement “world,” in the territory of a nation. Double counting could occur if an airline 
counts emission reductions toward its CORSIA compliance and the host nation also counts 
the reductions. The result would be to overstate the effectiveness, and undermine the integrity, 
3 See UNFCCC, “Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport (international bunker fuels)”: http://
unfccc.int/methods/emissions_from_intl_transport/items/1057.php.
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of both the Paris Agreement and CORSIA. We consider four distinct cases and the corre-
sponding steps needed to ensure reductions are only counted once:
Case I: Offsets originating in a sector covered by a Paris-Agreement Party’s NDC.
Example: A Paris-Agreement Party with an NDC covering the electricity sector replaces 
a thermal power plant with solar electricity. The resulting emission reduction is trans-
ferred to an airline for use in CORSIA.
Case II: Offsets originating in a Paris Party’s non-NDC sector.
Example: A Paris Party reduces emissions in its agriculture sector — a sector not 
covered by its NDC. The resulting emission reduction is transferred to an airline for 
use in CORSIA. 
Case III: Offsets originating in a non-Party to the Paris Agreement.
Example: An offset program verifies reductions in a subnational jurisdiction of a 
UNFCCC Party that is not a Party to the Paris Agreement, and those are transferred 
for use in CORSIA. 
Case IV: (Sustainable) Alternative Aviation Fuels ((S)AAF).
Example: An airline claims that it used SAAF on CORSIA-covered international flights 
and thereby reduced its offset obligation.
In each case, to prevent double counting, before an airline cancels emissions units for CORSIA 
compliance (or receives CORSIA credit for SAAF), the host Party should undertake three 
accounting steps. First, it must subtract the emissions units from the relevant pool of transfer-
able units that it hosts, publicly showing the transfer of title in a registry where the units are 
uniquely recorded. Second, if the reductions come from a sector covered by the host country’s 
NDC, then the transfer of this mitigation outcome from the Paris-Agreement “world” to the 
ICAO “world” must be reported in the Party’s progress-toward-NDC report required under 
Paris Agreement Article 13.7(b).
Third, regardless of whether the reductions come from an NDC or non-NDC sector, the host 
Party must account for the transfer of the reductions undergirding the transfer by record-
ing, in an account based on its inventory,4 the addition of a corresponding amount of emis-
sions. This requirement ensures no double counting. This requirement therefore should apply 
regardless of the originating program under which the units were generated (which might 
4 This account would be based on the host Party’s national inventory report under Paris Agreement Article 13.7(a) — or on its 
national inventory under the UNFCCC, if the host Party is not a Party to the Paris Agreement — and would reflect the addition 
described in the text.
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include Paris Agreement Article 6.4 or national/subnational programs with which compliance 
is mandatory, or voluntary programs).5
With regard to alternative fuels, CORSIA provides that “a methodology should be developed 
to ensure that an aircraft operator’s offsetting requirements…in a given year can be reduced 
through the use of sustainable alternative fuels” (ICAO 2016, par. 6). A CAEP task force is 
currently developing life-cycle assessments of various alternative fuels. Before an airline may 
claim these fuels as justifying a lowering of its CORSIA offsetting requirements, the fuels 
used must be subtracted from the pool of available fuels, and the host Party, in its national 
inventory report,6 must account for the export of the reductions undergirding the transfer by 
recording the addition of a corresponding amount of emissions.
Timing issues around these accounting steps, and inter-related questions about equivalent 
steps that could provide the same degree of accounting integrity, are quite important and 
bear further consideration. For example, suppose an airline executes an option contract for 
the future purchase of emissions reductions (or SAAF). If the host Party is not notified of 
the contract in advance, and the airline exercises the option many years later and purchased 
reductions that occurred in an already-passed year, then the addition of the corresponding 
amount of emissions into its inventory for the already-passed year could raise Paris-Agree-
ment-compliance concerns for the host Party. Such considerations weigh in favor of timing 
the accounting steps — or equivalent steps — to ensure that governments are not caught short 
by emissions-unit transfers.
Conclusion
Including these simple accounting steps in any “guidance” or “rules, modalities, and procedures” 
for the Paris Agreement (see Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.7), as well as in CORSIA SARPs, could 
play a crucial role in ensuring that when reductions are transferred from the UNFCCC-Paris-
Agreement “world” to the ICAO-CORSIA “world,” they are counted only once.
5 For reductions transferred under Paris Agreement Article 6.4, Article 6.5 specifies that these “shall not be used to demonstrate 
achievement of the host Party’s NDC if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its NDC.” While Article 6.5 does 
not mention CORSIA (understandably, since CORSIA was established a year later), the lack of mention of CORSIA in Article 6.5 
cannot be read as implicitly authorizing double counting vis-à-vis CORSIA, since double counting would breach the Agreement’s 
requirement that the Article 6.4 mechanism aims to “deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions” (Paris Agreement Article 
6.4(d)).
6 Or in its national inventory under the UNFCCC, if the host Party is not a Party to the Paris Agreement. The text of the Conven-
tion is at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
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Key Points
•	 Like the Paris Agreement as a whole, Article 6 combines elements that are 
determined nationally with others that are determined internationally.
•	 Articles 6.2 and 6.4 have in common that they are voluntary — i.e., it is 
wholly within a Party’s national discretion whether to use either one.
•	 Otherwise, there is a significant contrast between these provisions, as well 
as among various aspects of Article 6.2:
•	 Article 6.4 is near the “internationally determined” end of the contin-
uum.
•	 Article 6.2 is near the “internationally determined” end of the contin-
uum with respect to accounting, while other aspects are left to be 
“nationally determined.”
•	 A Party is free to take on requirements beyond those under the Agreement.
Introduction
The negotiation of the Paris Agreement was, to a large extent, about the appropriate balance 
between what is left to each Party to decide and what is decided (or at least encouraged) 
internationally. Negotiators searched for the sweet spot between the Kyoto Protocol’s “top 
down” approach and the Copenhagen Accord’s “bottom up” approach. The resulting Agree-
ment reflects a hybrid approach, with the core element (emissions targets) being nationally 
determined and other elements at varying points along a continuum from nationally to inter-
nationally determined. Article 6 likewise reflects a hybrid approach, with paragraphs 2 and 4 
taking very different approaches, and paragraph 2 itself taking different approaches internally.
A Continuum
The terms “nationally determined” and “internationally determined” (as well as “bottom up” 
and “top down”), while convenient shorthand, do not adequately convey the range of possi-
bilities upon which negotiators can draw when designing an agreement. Rather, nationally 
and internationally determined elements can be combined in many different ways. (Even 
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“continuum” does not quite capture the possibilities, as they run along several different lines, 
for example, determination of content, precision, “bindingness,” and enforcement.)
An agreement might allow a Party to decide whether to take on a particular commitment and, 
if so, allow the Party to shape its content. On the other hand, an agreement might obligate 
a Party to take on a commitment, dictate its terms, and make the fulfillment of the commit-
ment not only legally binding but subject to international enforcement.
Between these extremes, an agreement might provide for:
•	 Parties to follow an internationally agreed requirement but leave to each 
Party how to apply it;
•	 Parties to follow an internationally agreed requirement, authorize the 
Conference of Parties to elaborate the requirement in a legally binding 
manner, and require Parties to report internationally on how they are imple-
menting it, but stop short of an international enforcement mechanism; or
•	 the voluntary assumption of a commitment but dictate the terms of the 
commitment if a Party chooses to assume it.
The exact combination of elements with respect to each provision will depend upon the agree-
ment’s objective, national sensitivities, the need for various accommodations in both direc-
tions, and other factors.
Article 6.4
On the one hand, Article 6.4 is wholly discretionary (i.e., it is up to a Party to determine 
whether to use it). A Party is under no obligation to be a host. Likewise, a Party with a Nation-
ally Determined Contribution (NDC) is under no obligation to use a 6.4 reduction toward 
meeting its NDC. The Party might choose to implement its NDC wholly within its territory 
or use internationally transferred units/reductions from sources other than 6.4. (Article 6.4 is, 
by its terms, only “a” mechanism.)
On the other hand, should a Party choose to use 6.4, there appears to be very little discretion 
in how to use it. The Agreement and accompanying decision set forth extensive international 
criteria, both substantive and procedural. The CMA1 is authorized to adopt further rules, 
modalities, and procedures. Moreover, the operationalization of the criteria, rules, etc. falls 
to an international body, not individual Parties. Thus, even if a Party completely followed the 
relevant international criteria, it would not have succeeded in creating a qualifying reduction 
under 6.4. That must be done by the international body.
1 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
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It is interesting to note that, while 6.4 bears a strong resemblance to the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Article 12, the impetus for the extensive “internationally determined” nature of 6.4 is not 
the same as it was for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Under Kyoto, the Annex 
I Parties had emissions caps under which all traded/transferred units needed to be fungible. 
There was concern that if the CDM were to give Parties significant discretion to devise their 
own criteria or even to apply the international criteria themselves, non-fungible units would 
contaminate the system. In contrast, NDCs under the Paris Agreement are heterogeneous and 
not based on fungible units. In addition, they are not legally binding. Article 6.4’s design is 
more likely based on the desire to have readily available reductions with a pre-existing inter-
national “stamp of approval.”
Article 6.2
With the exception of being wholly voluntary, i.e., up to each Party to determine whether or 
not to transfer or use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), Article 6.2’s 
place on the continuum is quite different from that of 6.4. Article 6.2 contains three legally 
binding requirements:
•	 to “promote sustainable development”;
•	 to “ensure environmental integrity and transparency”; and
•	 to “apply robust accounting to ensure” (among other things) “the avoid-
ance of double counting.”
Only the robust accounting requirement is subject to international guidance, to be elaborated 
by the CMA.
•	 (Notwithstanding use of the word “guidance,” which sounds non-binding, 
6.2 clearly authorizes the CMA to develop legally binding guidance. It 
provides that Parties “shall” apply robust accounting “consistent with” the 
guidance to adopted by the CMA. The CMA has discretion whether to take 
advantage of that authorization. It could decide to adopt legally binding 
guidance, non-binding guidance, or a combination.)
The absence of guidance would not affect the ability of Parties to transfer/use ITMOs. They 
would still have an obligation to apply robust accounting and would report through the trans-
parency framework how they were doing so.
Significantly, unlike 6.4, Article 6.2 does not define (or authorize the CMA to define) “what” 
can be transferred or from whom.
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In sum:
•	 The CMA cannot limit what constitutes an ITMO under 6.2 (such as 
confining transfers to particular types of NDCs or globally fungible units). 
As such, there might be a variety of linkages among heterogeneous systems/
policies.
•	 Each Party will decide nationally how to promote sustainable development 
and ensure environmental integrity and transparency.
•	 With respect to accounting, a Party’s national discretion is limited. Its 
approach to accounting must comport with any CMA guidance.
•	 Each Party would report under the transparency framework on how it is 
implementing each of the above requirements, including how it is ensuring 
environmental integrity.
Going beyond Paris requirements
Nothing in Article 6.2 or 6.4 limits a Party’s ability to go beyond its requirements where it 
deems appropriate. Reporting and review under the transparency framework may provide 
motivation for additional stringency. For example:
•	 A Party might unilaterally decide not to acquire or use particular types of 
ITMOs.
•	 A group of Parties or other relevant entities might pledge (such as through 
a “carbon club”) to abide by stricter requirements.
•	 A Party or Parties might decide to allow the acquisition of particular 
ITMOs from other Parties/entities for purposes of domestic law but not 
for purposes of fulfilling an NDC.
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Key points
•	 Little progress has been made in operationalizing the Paris Agreement and 
its Article 6 since COP-21,1 and it will be challenging, but not impossible, 
to produce a rulebook by the end of COP-24 in late 2018. This will require 
a focused approach by Parties, starting with their submissions ahead of 
COP-23, in late 2017.
•	 Parties need to consider whether issues must be negotiated in parallel 
(“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”), or whether some issues 
are so fundamental that it would be better to give them priority. The scope 
of Article 6.2, and the definition and quantification of internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), are examples of issues that may 
require early resolution.
•	 Articles 6.2 and 6.4 provide Parties with alternatives for the governance of 
ITMOs. While the distinction between these articles, in terms of standards 
and governance, may blur over time, it is important that they remain avail-
able as distinct options for now.
Overview
Almost two years after concluding the Paris Agreement at COP-21, Parties have not made 
significant progress towards operationalizing its provisions. In particular, there is growing 
concern about prospects for completing the rule book for Article 6 by the end of COP-24, 
given the complexity and very technical nature of the issues in front of negotiators, and the 
“constructive ambiguity” found in parts of the text.
Article 6 has sometimes been mislabelled the “markets article,” when in fact it is much more 
than that. The inclusion of robust provisions for emissions markets in the Paris Agreement was 
a surprise, but should not be, if the contents of Article 6 are properly understood.
In fact, Article 6 addresses the role of international cooperation in meeting the goals and 
objectives of the Paris Agreement, and is intended to help Parties meet their Nationally Deter-
1 Twenty-First Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.
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mined Contributions (NDCs). Its specific provisions for the creation and transfer of mitiga-
tion outcomes under UNFCCC rules represent, and should be seen as, special cases of inter-
national cooperation.
Components of Article 6
Article 6 has four distinct provisions. Article 6.1 recognizes that broad cooperation will play a 
role in implementing NDCs. However, Article 6.1 stops short of being an enabling article, as 
it works under the overall assumption that Parties do not need to seek permission to cooper-
ate.
Articles 6.2 and 6.3 refer to the special case of international cooperation, when an inter-
national transfer of mitigation outcomes takes place. There appear to be no provisions in 
the Paris Agreement that limit the scope of ITMOs. ITMOs may be used towards NDCs, 
provided that they meet a number of “shall” provisions: promote sustainable development; 
ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance; and are consistent 
with guidance for accounting rules, as developed by the CMA.2
It is fairly clear that Articles 6.2 and 6.3 are meant to give Parties the option of using ITMOs 
under a governance structure that largely devolves accountability to the cooperating Parties. It 
must be highlighted that Parties have different opinions concerning the use of ITMOs, absent 
accounting guidance being developed by the CMA. Some Parties argue that there is nothing 
to prevent the use of ITMOs in the absence of such guidance.
Possible outcomes under Article 6.2 include the emergence of multiple ITMOs as NDC 
compliance instruments (or currencies). The Paris-Agreement-compliance value of these 
ITMOs would be nationally determined, but could be capped at the face value of the miti-
gation outcome in the issuing jurisdiction. In addition, given the different levels of effort 
reflected in different countries’ NDCs, these ITMOs may have a floating value.3 Another 
obvious role for Article 6.2 could be to provide a framework for directly linking individual 
countries’ domestic emissions trading schemes.
Articles 6.4–6.7 are widely seen as similar to Article 6.2 (in terms of what they deliver), but 
with two essential differences: First, governance under these articles is placed squarely and 
overwhelmingly under the authority of the CMA; second, unlike Article 6.2, they provide 
rules for the creation of mitigation outcomes. Mitigation outcomes produced under Article 
6.4 ought to become ITMOs, after their initial issuance by the CMA. Beyond the initial issu-
ance, in what could be seen as transfer in the secondary market, mitigation outcomes issued 
2 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
3 See also briefs by Aldy, Stock, and Parry in this volume.
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under Article 6.4 should be treated as any other transfer between Parties, and become ITMOs 
covered by the rules of Article 6.2
Possible outcomes from Articles 6.4–6.7 could include the emergence of compliance instru-
ments that, like currency, would be good for NDC compliance, would be issued by the CMA, 
and could be used by all Parties. Similar to certified emission reductions (CERs) and emis-
sion reduction units (ERUs),4 such compliance instruments could be used to indirectly link 
domestic trading schemes. Article 6.4 can be seen as providing multiple “windows,” such 
as CDM+,5 certification of non-UNFCCC mechanisms (e.g., VCS, JCM6), or as providing 
unbundled services (e.g., UNFCCC MRV for the Green Climate Fund).
Articles 6.8 and 6.9, the non-market portions of Article 6, have been seen, unfairly, as a “give-
away” to some Parties in exchange for the market provisions of Article 6. Key aspects of these 
articles, including their purpose and the types of cooperation they cover, are not yet well 
defined. The scope of these articles could evolve over time, with some countries arguing that 
they could play an important role in addressing the sustainability of the economic and social 
transitions necessitated by climate-change mitigation, including addressing the competitive 
aspects of international climate policy, which will become a very significant issue — sooner 
rather than later.
Ambiguities in Article 6
As in all international agreements, there are “constructive ambiguities” in the Paris Agree-
ment. Article 6 is no exception. Many Parties seem determined to explore different interpreta-
tions of what they see, or want to see, as ambiguity in the text of the Agreement.
These ambiguities have been captured in the “informal information notes” of the Co-Facili-
tators from the 46th session of the SBSTA7 in May 2017.8 The informal notes aim to collect 
all issues that Parties may want to discuss at future sessions. While these documents are well 
intended, the list of issues they present is heavily politicized and difficult to use. Some Parties 
object strongly to the inclusion of issues on any list, and want, at all costs, to avoid return-
ing to protracted negotiations over issues that they see as having “already been put to bed” in 
Paris.
4 CER is the mitigation unit of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism; ERU is the mitigation unit of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Joint Implementation mechanism.
5 I.e., an enhanced or elaborated version of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism.
6 Verified Carbon Standard (www.v-c-s.org); Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism (www.jcm.go.jp).
7 UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.
8 https://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/items/10276txt.php.
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The disclaimers in the Co-Facilitator documents provide a good indication of the difficul-
ties that lie ahead: “The informal list does not attempt to capture convergence or divergence. The 
informal list does not represent agreement; and does not represent agreed views, or agreed ideas or 
agreed text. The informal list does not represent…”9 So, in the end, what does the list represent? 
If negotiations continue at this pace and in this spirit, the likelihood of completing a rule 
book for Article 6 at COP-24 is not very high.
If, on the other hand, Parties do expect to complete the rule book for Article 6 at COP-24, the 
next logical step for them was to provide, in their submissions for SBSTA 47, which were due 
October 2, 2017, their views on the issues that need to be addressed and that are captured in 
the above-mentioned informal notes. Time will tell how disciplined and focused the submis-
sions are.
One question that needs to be considered is whether issues must be negotiated in parallel (i.e., 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”) or whether some issues are so fundamental 
that their resolution significantly affects other issues and thus requires that they be addressed 
first. For illustrative purposes only, and not by way of offering an exhaustive list of potentially 
fundamental issues, some items in this category may include: (a) What is an ITMO? (b) Do 
ITMOs need to be quantified in CO2-equivalent terms only? (c) What is the relationship 
between Articles 6.2 and 6.4, and when does a mitigation outcome issued under Article 6.4 
become an ITMO?
 On the question of what constitutes an ITMO, some Parties would like to essentially recreate 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, and allow the use of Article 6.2 only by Parties that have 
quantified absolute caps and can issue a new type of assigned amount unit (AAU). The initial 
reaction from other Parties is that such an approach is not justified by any reference in the 
Paris Agreement. In addition, it would negate the “nationally determined” part of the NDC. 
Finally, it can be seen as a renegotiation of the Paris Agreement or, at best, a special/simplified 
case of the Paris Agreement.
Another significant issue is whether ITMOs need to be quantified in CO2-equivalent terms 
only. Several points argue against this approach. First, it negates the bottom-up ethos of the 
Paris Agreement. Second, there is no justification for such a requirement under the Paris 
Agreement. Third, the Paris Agreement, including the “institutional memory” of its nego-
tiators and stakeholders, and other submissions, points to a very broad scope for ITMOs. 
Fourth and finally, such an approach “pierces the national veil” — that is, many NDCs are 
not expressed in CO2-equivalent terms and would need to be translated to become ITMOs. In 
that case, who would decide what the appropriate conversion factor is for translating different 
types of mitigation commitments to CO2-equivalents?
9 Emphasis added. See, for example, https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10a_infor-
mal_note_final.pdf.
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between Article 6.2 and Article 6.41
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Key Points
•	 The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 market mechanisms may provide govern-
ments with access to less costly mitigation options than would be avail-
able domestically and therefore could provide an important incentive to 
increase the ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
over time.
•	 There are, however, critical issues to be resolved if market participants are 
to have confidence in the new regime and the potential of the Paris Mecha-
nisms is to be realized. Among these:
•	 Additionality must be defined carefully in the Paris-Agreement 
context, especially if applied to policy instruments — in part through 
application of cost-benefit analysis.
•	 The Article 6.4 mechanism should build on the strengths of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), applying CDM rules and accept-
ing CDM projects and certified emission reductions (CERs) as far as 
possible.
•	 Resolution of these and other issues—and realizing Article 6’s potential—
depends heavily on formulating sound accounting rules and processes in 
the context of heterogeneous NDCs.
The legacies of the Kyoto Mechanisms
A key innovation of the Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997 was the set of three market mecha-
nisms made available to countries with national emission commitments — the CDM, Joint 
Implementation (JI), and International Emissions Trading (IET). The CDM enabled green-
house gas mitigation projects in countries without commitments to generate emissions cred-
its, while JI was limited to projects in countries with commitments. IET allowed governments 
to directly transfer emissions units from their national emissions budgets.
1 I would like to thank the German Ministry of Education and Research for funding the project “Transformative Ambitionssteiger-
ung – Der Beitrag effektiver Klimapolitikinstrumente (TABEK)” (01LS1621A) in whose context this article has been written.
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The CDM became the most heavily used of the three Kyoto Mechanisms. Until the end of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, over 1.8 billion CERs were issued from projects in 
over 90 developing countries. Over 8,000 projects and activities under programs have been 
formally registered to date. A critical aspect of the CDM’s success was the monetary incentive 
it created for private sector players, coupled with limited interference by government agencies. 
JI suffered from governance challenges in countries in transition, while the IET faced a lack of 
demand due to the unwillingness of governments in Western Europe to buy emissions units 
perceived as “hot air” (i.e., emission reductions that were surplus in the sense that they were 
not due to specific mitigation efforts).
The ambition of the Paris Agreement and how market mechanisms 
can contribute
Although it relies on a “bottom up” regime of voluntary individual country commitments, the 
Paris Agreement of 2015 is noteworthy for its high ambition. It seeks to limit the increase in 
global average temperature from preindustrial levels to “well below” 2° C, and specifies that a 
balance of emissions and sinks is to be achieved in the second half of the century.
Given that each country has full freedom to determine its NDC under the Paris Agreement, 
it is crucial to allow full access to all globally available mitigation options. If governments 
develop trust that they can access cheap mitigation worldwide, they may be willing to increase 
the ambition of their NDCs over time. Thus, market mechanisms are even more important 
under the Paris-Agreement architecture than they were under Kyoto. The negotiators in Paris 
realized this, and, against all expectations, put an entire article on market mechanisms in the 
text of the Agreement.
The skeleton of the rulebook for mechanisms in Articles 6.2 and 6.4
As was the case under the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement only provides key principles 
for market mechanisms; the detailed rulebook is still under negotiation with a deadline of 
2018. The Agreement defines two mechanisms: one under international oversight (“sustain-
able development mechanism” [SDM], Article 6.4) and one based on agreement between 
governments (“cooperative approaches” [CA], Article 6.2). Common principles include envi-
ronmental integrity, transparency, and prevention of double counting. The latter is important 
as, in contrast with the Kyoto regime, all countries contribute to mitigation under the Paris 
Agreement. This necessitates a clear allocation of mitigation outcomes to the host and the 
buyer country’s NDC. It is likely that the Paris mechanisms will allow crediting on the scale 
of policy instruments or entire sectors, thus going beyond projects and programs.
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Critical issues to be resolved in the UNFCCC negotiations
Market mechanisms have often been criticized as generating emission credits that do not reflect 
real mitigation. In this context, the concept of “additionality” is paramount. Any credit gener-
ated by an activity that only reflects “business-as-usual” dilutes overall mitigation ambition. 
While tests for additionality have been refined and made robust for projects and programs in 
the context of the CDM, efforts to develop such tests for policy instruments are still in their 
infancy. The issue becomes challenging in the context of the Paris Agreement, where there is 
no international oversight for the baselines used in the context of NDCs. This makes it likely 
that a number of NDCs will generate “hot air” because their mitigation scenario is actually 
less ambitious than the real “business-as-usual” scenario.
Also, the issue of how far CDM projects and programs, as well as already issued CERs, are 
to be brought into the Paris mechanisms is of considerable importance (Michaelowa 2016 
and Michaelowa and Hoch 2016). Due to the crash of CER prices to extremely low levels 
after 2012, a large volume of CERs has piled up. Between 2012 and 2020, over 9 billion 
CERs could accrue, while the decade 2020–2030 could generate another 8 billion CERs. 
These volumes could provide a kick-start to the first round of NDC strengthening from 2018 
onwards.
Accounting rules with regard to the nature of units that can be transferred, types of registries, 
and eventual buyer or seller liability need to be specified. Positive experiences with account-
ing under the Kyoto Protocol would call for a continuation of that system, while significant 
differences between NDCs will make it difficult to agree on a common unit and approach.
Recommendations to maximize the contribution of market 
mechanisms
Additionality determinations for policy instruments should theoretically be based on a cost-
benefit analysis. Only policies whose costs exceed their benefits should be seen as additional. 
A pragmatic approach would be to deem all carbon pricing policies additional once the carbon 
price exceeds a threshold value. This value would ideally reflect the social cost of carbon2; in 
practice, it should be differentiated according to the development status of the host country. 
For regulatory policy instruments, additionality could depend on the payback period of the 
technologies that need to be applied due to the regulation; a level of 3–4 years would reflect 
industrial reality.
Pilot activities for upscaled crediting should put an emphasis on testing such additionality 
approaches, supported by political and economic research regarding choice of policy instru-
2 See also briefs by Joseph Aldy and James Stock in this volume.
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ments. To ensure that CAs under Article 6.2 do not function as generic loopholes,3 minimum 
rules for demonstrating additionality should be the same for Article 6.4 and Article 6.2.
Article 6.4 should apply CDM rules and accept CDM projects and CERs as far as possible. 
This sustains the trust of participants in the CDM market who might otherwise be alienated 
from market mechanisms and thus maximizes the mitigation contribution of market mecha-
nisms.
With regard to accounting, basic eligibility criteria for the use of credits from market mecha-
nisms could be envisaged. Universal adjustments for transfers, cancellations, and banking, and 
common reporting rules on cooperation, systems, and annual transactions, would increase 
trust in market mechanisms.
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Key Points
•	 The operationalization of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is still incom-
plete, leaving windows of opportunity for alternative interpretations.
•	 For instance, it is possible to develop a legally sound interpretation of Arti-
cle 6 based upon the literature on climate clubs.1
•	 Such an interpretation could lead to a harmonious understanding of Arti-
cle 6, significantly enhancing its potential usefulness in advancing the goals 
of the Paris Agreement.
Introduction
Uncertainty surrounds the operationalization of the Paris Agreement. For instance, no shared 
interpretation of its Article 6 exists, and the ongoing debate seems unlikely to improve clarity 
over its three main components, all of which represent approaches to the exchange of mitiga-
tion outcomes: (a) cooperative approaches (paragraphs 1–3), (b) the Sustainable Development 
Mechanism (paragraphs 4–7), and (c) non-market mechanisms (paragraphs 8–9).
Although Article 6 is only one of a number of issues within the Paris Agreement that require 
negotiation, it is regarded as crucial to operationalizing the Agreement. Article 6 is widely 
perceived as a heterogeneous, last-minute compromise, in which the needs and demands of 
all the different parties have been bundled together; this rather limiting view prevails largely 
because the three approaches contained within paragraphs 1 to 9 of the Paris Agreement are 
considered to be independent of one another.
This paper offers a new, legally sound interpretation of Article 6. Applying a “climate-club” 
perspective, this interpretation could lead to a homogeneous framework that would enable 
different approaches to exchanging mitigation outcomes, assuming the enhancement of a 
mitigation outcome demand-and-supply system. If properly adopted, this interpretation 
could lead to Article 6 being used to help achieve the Paris Agreement’s primary objectives.
1 This paper is mainly based upon sections 4.4 and 4.5 of Stua (2017).
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Climate clubs and Article 6
A review of Article 6 based on the literature concerning climate clubs can be used to identify 
elements of any typical club. Such an exercise highlights the deep connection between climate 
clubs and Article 6. This analysis leads to a view of Article 6 as a “tool” for implementing a 
transformational club as defined by Weischer, et al. (2012), and characterized by the major 
conditions for a successful club identified by Nordhaus (2015, p. 1340). The review provides a 
homogeneous interpretation of Article 6, in which its elements fit together like puzzle pieces, 
framing a single pattern that can accommodate any instance related to the current debate on 
Article 6 and beyond.
A review of Article 6 based on the literature highlights significant analogies between clubs and 
Article 6, summarized in the following key points:
•	 Voluntary cooperation. The founding principle of Article 6, expressed 
in its first paragraph, represents one of the keystones of the literature on 
climate clubs (Hale 2011; Das 2015; Nordhaus 2015; Orsato, et al. 2015; 
Potoski 2015).
•	 Ambition. Expressly cited as Article 6’s primary objective (paragraph 1), 
ambition recurs in the literature, with authors (Das, 2015; Falkner, 2016) 
considering it as the key to unleashing the power of clubs. Keohane, et al. 
(2015) identify in clubs a resource for broadening ambition in mitigation, 
while Weischer, et al. (2012) include ambition in the list of features that 
are central to a transformational club.
•	 Equity, speed, and participation. Together with ambition, equity, speed, 
and participation are the other essential features of a transformational club 
(Weischer et al, 2012). While the aim for participation is explicit within 
paragraph 4(b) of Article 6, equity and speed are only implied—equity is 
a theme throughout the Paris Agreement, while speed is the aim of para-
graphs 2 and 4 of Article 6, which provide a mechanism for supporting 
NDCs and fostering mitigation in global emissions.
•	 Transparency, environmental integrity, accounting. Paragraphs 2, 4, and 
5 of Article 6 make explicit reference to the need for mechanisms to guaran-
tee environmental integrity and accounting, while calling for greater trans-
parency. Effective implementation measures for transparency, accounting, 
and environmental integrity represent core elements in the literature on 
climate clubs (Stewart, et al. 2013; Keohane et al 2015; Falkner 2016), 
including non-compliance criteria analyses and related legal implications 
(Eckersley 2012; Weischer, et al. 2012; Stewart, et al. 2013; Bulkeley, et 
al. 2014).
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•	 Certification mechanisms. The literature discusses the use of certification 
mechanisms as enhancing tools for action. Some scholars favor certification 
to facilitate carbon market approaches and to enhance transparency (Reid 
and Toffel 2009; Potoski 2015). Paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 6 entirely focus 
on the design and implementation of a certification mechanism; in prin-
ciple, these paragraphs are in line with the goal of clubs. While analyzing 
how these mechanisms function, Keohane, et al. (2015) emphasize their 
significance in avoiding double counting, which concurs with paragraph 2 
of Article 6.
•	 International legitimacy. Weischer, et al. (2012) introduce the concept 
of “bringing in,” defining this concept in terms of “groups of countries 
who are willing to undertake particular commitments or actions agree to 
have those negotiated, recognized and monitored within the UNFCCC” 
(Weischer, et al. 2012, p. 191). Stewart, et al. (2013) suggest that the clubs’ 
regimes should be linked to the UNFCCC process “in a way that respects 
the need for multilateralism in addressing the global character and conse-
quences of climate change” (Stewart, et al. 2013, p. 10). Other scholars 
reiterate the need for such legitimation (Eckersley 2012; Das 2015; Falkner 
2016), and indeed the rules contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of Article 
6 could satisfy the demands of international legitimacy for climate clubs.
•	 Adherence to social, economic, and policy circumstances. The literature 
calls for clubs to be designed with rules and features that fit the social, 
economic, and policy circumstances in which they operate (Potoski and 
Prakash 2009). Article 6 implies similar needs when referring to the promo-
tion of sustainable development (paragraphs 2, 4, 8, and 9) and links with 
NDCs (paragraphs 1–5 and 8).
•	 Quantified aggregate and individual mitigation targets. The call for 
aggregate targets is a recurring theme in the literature (Weischer, et al. 
2012; Stewart, et al. 2013; Victor 2015). It is also implicit in sections (c) 
and (d) of paragraph 4 in Article 6, identifying the described mechanism as 
a tool for achieving mitigation targets at national and global levels.
•	 Excludable benefits. Assigned to members through clubs’ specific design, 
excludable benefits are key to stimulate participation in clubs and are exten-
sively discussed in the literature (Weischer, et al. 2012; Stewart, et al. 2013; 
Keohane, et al. 2015; Nordhaus 2015; Orsato, et al. 2015; Falkner 2016). 
Article 6 does not explicitly refer to excludable benefits, but such benefits 
would seem necessary to guarantee the efficacy and durability of any Article 
6-generated structure for advancing mitigation outcomes.
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Conclusions
The solid links between Article 6 and climate clubs suggest that clubs present the ideal frame-
work for effectively operationalizing Article 6. Nonetheless, a significant issue still requires 
resolution. While describing the major conditions for a successful climate club, Nordhaus 
defines the club approach as “top-down,” comparing it to Bretton Woods as an ideal model 
(Nordhaus 2015, p. 1344). Any club-based structure eventually resulting from Article 6 
would then be top-down, which would appear to directly contradict the “pledge and review” 
approach envisaged by the Paris Agreement. However, this apparent contrast is balanced by 
the voluntary nature of cooperation within Article 6, which means that members of an Article 
6-based transformational club may freely decide to adopt a top-down structure for their club, 
without infringing on the general rules of the Paris Agreement.
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Key Points
•	 Meeting the Paris Agreement’s ambitious emissions-reduction goals requires 
early, sustained, and significant global reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
•	 The Paris Agreement’s Article 6.2 recognizes the role that carbon markets 
can play in catalyzing deeper cuts in climate pollution.
•	 While internationally transferred mitigation outcomes must be accounted 
“consistent with” any guidance agreed by the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment, countries and sub-national jurisdictions need not wait for interna-
tionally-agreed guidance before transferring mitigation outcomes.
The Paris Agreement represents a paradigm shift in the global response to climate change. 
Instead of establishing binding reduction targets for only some countries, the Agreement 
sets a “top-down” maximum long-term temperature goal and calls on all countries from the 
“bottom-up” to present their own voluntary, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
toward that global goal.
Carbon markets, used today in about 40 national jurisdictions and over 20 cities, states, and 
regions (World Bank 2016), deliver emission reductions at significantly lower cost than other 
approaches (Schmalensee and Stavins 2017). Savings in the context of the Agreement’s ambi-
tious climate goals could be substantial — reducing the cost of meeting NDCs by approxi-
mately 32 percent by 2030 and by 54 percent by 2050 (World Bank 2016). By reducing costs 
and unlocking finance, carbon markets can catalyze more ambitious global emissions reduc-
tions. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement may be said to reflect widespread recognition of this 
fact.
Article 6 also reflects the hybrid design of the Paris Agreement, with its top-down and bottom-
up elements. It recognizes the broad prerogative of sovereign countries to use carbon markets 
to help achieve their NDCs, including via a new, top-down centralized mechanism (Article 
6.4) and through bottom-up, decentralized “cooperative approaches” (Article 6.2), negotiated 
and authorized by cooperating countries (Article 6.3). While the 6.4 mechanism is placed 
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under the “authority and guidance” of the CMA,1 Article 6.2 confines the CMA’s role to 
developing “guidance” for Parties engaging in cooperative approaches, with a particular focus 
on “robust accounting” to avoid “double-counting” of emission reductions.
Ongoing negotiations among Parties reveal divergence on a number of crucial issues, includ-
ing the scope of Article 6.2 guidance. (Some Parties also urge a formal regulatory role for the 
CMA under Article 6.2, although nothing in the text of the article or its negotiating history 
support such a role.) However, lack of agreement at the multilateral negotiations on the 
scope of CMA guidance need not delay bilateral or “minilateral” carbon market cooperation. 
Indeed, some countries may wish to begin working together to develop “model” transactions 
that could transparently fulfill the obligations that Article 6.2 and 6.3 place on transacting 
Parties.
Such early initiatives should be encouraged, for four reasons. First, and most importantly, 
unlocking early cooperation and finance can accelerate the pace of emissions reductions. This 
is particularly important because rapid and early emissions cuts are the single most impor-
tant determinant of whether the global community is likely to meet the Paris Agreement’s 
long-term temperature goal (Rogelj, et al. 2013). Second, delaying action to reduce emissions 
increases costs for Parties and the global economy (IEA 2011).
Further, an early start would provide Parties, investors, and domestic regulated entities with 
the time to hammer out details and deliver much-needed predictability. Repeatedly, we have 
seen that when countries set clear “rules of the road” for emissions trading, investments begin 
flowing into lower-emitting technologies and processes, and emissions drop. Lastly, standards 
developed by a subset of countries — particularly those with interest in and experience with 
high-integrity market cooperation — may be of a quality and detail that would be difficult to 
agree by consensus among all Parties to the Paris Agreement. Evidence of the benefits of rigor-
ous standards among partner countries could demonstrate the usefulness and practicality of 
setting a high bar for market cooperation, helping to inform and accelerate the development 
of similar standards globally.
Engaging in carbon market cooperation under Article 6.2 is not dependent upon the CMA’s 
adoption of guidance. Article 6.2 simply provides that, if such guidance is adopted, Parties’ 
accounting must be “consistent with” it. Article 6.1 explicitly “recognize[s]” the existing sover-
eign prerogative of Parties — coequal sovereigns under international law — to choose “volun-
tary cooperation in the implementation of their [NDCs].” The only “authorization” required 
is from a participating partner(s), under Article 6.3. International law generally recognizes 
1 Conference of the Parties [to the UNFCCC] serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (the governing body for 
the Paris Agreement).
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that sovereign states are free to act so long as they do not contravene an explicit international 
prohibition (the Lotus principle2).
Of course, states are also free to constrain their sovereignty through international agreements. 
An example is Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, in which the UNFCCC Parties established 
a new, centralized market mechanism “under the authority” of the CMA. This article states 
that the new mechanism “shall be supervised” by a body designated by the CMA. Article 6.7 
states that the CMA “shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures” for the new mechanism. 
These provisions expressly mandate that the CMA take on a direct regulatory role, and indi-
cate that Parties cannot unilaterally create 6.4-compliant emission reduction units. Article 6.4 
thus differs significantly from Article 6.2, which does not require that the CMA “shall” do 
anything before Parties engage in cooperation.
Mirroring the Paris Agreement as a whole, Article 6.2’s hybrid design — obligatory, high-
level principles implemented by participating Parties via a flexible, decentralized framework 
— may provide a roadmap for the future of international cooperation on carbon markets. 
Ultimately, it is up to interested partner countries to agree on the detailed rules of the road 
that can catalyze high-integrity international carbon market cooperation under Article 6.2 
(Keohane, et al. 2015). Recognizing both the need and opportunity, cooperating countries 
themselves can make substantial, early progress, ultimately informing and complementing the 
longer-term UNFCCC process.
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China’s Emissions Trading System in Context
Jackson Ewing 
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Key Points
•	 Beyond addressing global climate change, China’s national emissions trad-
ing system (ETS) is part of Beijing’s effort to forge a cleaner and more 
dynamic modern economy, and this context is essential when considering 
its future direction and effectiveness.
•	 While China’s national ETS launch will likely go forward in advance of 
the COP-231 negotiations in November 2017, continuing questions on 
coverage, allowance allocation, and compliance obligations are unlikely to 
be settled by then.
•	 Once launched, China’s ETS will be uniquely placed to pursue market 
integration efforts in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Its success will 
hinge on domestic capacity building and operational discipline, and the 
effectiveness of its international engagement.
Introduction
China’s GDP has grown by more than 500 percent since 1980, bringing quality of life improve-
ments and strategic ascension alongside wealth gaps, economic inefficiencies, and wide-rang-
ing pollution. These wealth gaps are driving efforts for more balanced growth, economic 
inefficiencies are leading to glut and waste reductions and higher-value economic activity, and 
pollution is moving environmental policy up the strata of government priorities.
Beyond addressing global climate change, China’s national ETS is part of Beijing’s effort to 
address all of these challenges, and to forge a cleaner and more dynamic modern economy. The 
ETS’s design, goals, and position within China’s wider policy landscape reflect this context — 
a recognition that is essential for considering its future direction and effectiveness.
Busy times in Beijing
China’s national ETS is set to become the principal policy tool for transitioning the country 
to a lower emissions future. The task is daunting. Building on seven pilot systems that began 
operation in 2013, China’s national ETS will cover the highest emitters in the most emis-
sions-intensive sectors across the country. Since 2015, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) has worked to determine the scope of industry coverage, construct 
1 Twenty-Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.
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a national MRV system, coordinate provincial reporting on the carbon inventories of more 
than 8,000 entities, and feed this information into a coherent national quota allocation plan. 
As the launch approaches, the NDRC is revising offset rules, picking a national exchange 
platform from among the pilots, codifying how authority will be delegated, and putting ETS 
management practices and technical standards in place. Throughout this process the NDRC 
also serves as the champion and decipherer of the national ETS to the ultimate decision-
makers in China’s State Council.
Given this workload, it is unsurprising that ambition for the national ETS launch is steadily 
tempering. While the launch will likely go forward in advance of the COP-23 negotiations 
in November 2017, continuing questions on coverage, allowance allocation, and compliance 
obligations are unlikely to be settled by then. Initial ETS coverage of eight sectors has been 
pared down for 2017 to power generation, aluminum, cement, and aviation — which alone 
would constitute a cap of 4–5 billion tons of CO2 (roughly 1.5 times the size of the European 
Union [EU] ETS) (Shanghai Zhixin Carbon Assess Management 2017). Reports from mid-
August 2017 suggest more culling may be in the works, and that China may begin by launch-
ing a power-sector-only ETS in response to lingering uncertainties and industry concerns on 
allocation methodologies and overall ETS operations (Reklev and Chen 2017). This scenario 
breeds further difficulties for an ETS designed to see trade across different industries facing 
different mitigation costs. With only months to go, basic questions remain on when the 
scheme will start, what the rules will be, where it will be housed, and who will participate.
China’s approach of pilot systems followed by a multiphase national rollout anticipates such 
growing pains, which will continue in varied forms even as future progress is made. More 
fundamental questions surround the interaction of China’s ETS with other policy instru-
ments. While the ETS is under NDRC leadership, its rules spread across the jurisdictions of 
multiple government agencies. Poor coordination and collaboration between these players is 
behind many current ETS design struggles.
The national ETS also exists in a complicated and often overlapping environmental policy 
space marked by existing and proposed trading and subsidy policies for renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and air pollution. These policy tools, which include a newly-launched trade-
able green certificate scheme to support clean technologies, expand the risk of double count-
ing and create complex interactions with the supply and demand of carbon credits. EU experi-
ences have shown how subsidizing renewable energy can decrease demand for carbon credits 
and erode the value of an ETS, and recent modelling of these interactions in China suggest 
similar challenges (Wu, et al. 2017).
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Looking abroad
Outside its borders, China’s ETS will impact international carbon trading and climate mitiga-
tion efforts in unforeseeable ways. The scale of its market and presence of covered industries 
in international supply chains means that China’s ETS will have myriad impacts on trade, 
competitiveness, and carbon prices in other markets around the world (Swartz 2016). China 
is also uniquely placed to pursue market-integration efforts in the Asia-Pacific region and 
beyond. Like China, the Republic of Korea is in a formative phase in its construction of a 
national ETS, while Japan operates subnational carbon trading schemes and international 
offset projects.2 Countries in South, Southeast, and Central Asia are likewise constructing 
carbon markets, and these efforts may accelerate with China’s 2017 national ETS launch 
(Ewing 2017).
Targeted links connecting Asian markets, along with potential links with Europe and the 
Americas, would widen the emissions reduction options available for emitters and help provide 
the scale and liquidity needed for robust trading platforms. Such links would also reflect the 
economic connections that define much of Asia and the global economy, and discourage the 
leakage of emissions to less regulated jurisdictions. For China, market cooperation and selec-
tive links could lead to revenue generation as it sells credits to neighbors that face higher 
abatement costs, and yield geopolitical dividends as a form of regional and international 
climate change leadership.
Forging such links would take time and require technical expertise, strategic vision, and diplo-
matic energy. Work is underway to move carbon market cooperation up regional political 
agendas and create a regional epistemic community. To be successful, these efforts must forge 
symbiotic relationships that contribute to disparate national interests in Asia and beyond 
(Ewing 2016). Building these relationships will require patient experimentation and creative 
bargaining during the formative years of market operations. China’s willingness to create a 
“linkage-ready” ETS is essential, and while Beijing is understandably fixated on its domestic 
rollout, indications suggest it will do just that.
Raison d’etre
China’s national ETS launch will likely draw international acclaim and support the sense that 
Beijing is becoming a global climate change leader. While it addresses greenhouse-gas mitiga-
tion most directly, China’s ETS is perhaps equally important in the minds of Chinese leaders 
as a way to curtail crippling air pollution, encourage growth in emergent sectors, and transfer 
wealth to peripheral provinces. Whether these intentions will impede its effectiveness as a 
mitigation tool is unclear. The ETS may follow the Deng Xiaoping maxim that “it does not 
matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice,” and lead to robust climate 
2 See also brief by Suh-Yong Chung in this volume.
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change mitigation alongside the co-benefits Chinese leaders seek. It may rather demonstrate 
that the multiple drivers of the ETS and overlapping policies that exist alongside it render the 
mechanism convoluted and ineffective.
The outcome will depend largely on China’s domestic capacity building and operational disci-
pline, and the effectiveness of its international engagement. At home, Chinese authorities 
must create and maintain effective systems with judicious caps and allocations, and then 
provide these systems the policy space and freedom from government intervention to work. 
Since international market cooperation requires that China develop dependable MRV, strong 
trading platforms, and clear rules, such engagement would enhance the climate impacts of 
China’s ETS while creating opportunities for stakeholders beyond its borders.
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Laying the Foundation for CO2 Emissions Trading in China
Valerie J. Karplus 
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Key Points
•	 China plans to launch a national CO2 emissions trading system (ETS) by 
the end of 2017, substantially increasing the global share of greenhouse 
gases under carbon pricing.
•	 The capabilities required to support emissions trading — especially 
measurement, reporting, and verification of energy, emissions, and output 
data — remain unevenly developed and weakly coordinated across subna-
tional governments and enterprises within China.
•	 China’s staged approach involves strengthening emissions accounting prior 
to launching emissions trading, which will provide a strong foundation for 
domestic system expansion as well as an example for establishing emissions 
trading in other developing countries.
•	 Longer term, establishing high-quality energy and emissions data will be 
essential to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the system and to facilitate 
linkages with other systems.
Emissions trading as a major climate policy tool in china
China plans to launch a national CO2 ETS before the end of 2017. Emissions trading is 
expected to play an important role in supporting the implementation of China’s 2015 Paris-
Agreement pledge commitments, which include reducing the CO2 intensity of the economy 
by 60–65 percent between 2005 and 2030 and reaching peak CO2 emissions by 2030.
1 Impor-
tantly, system designers intend for a CO2 ETS to promote the development of energy and 
emissions management capabilities at all levels of government and within enterprises. These 
capabilities will be essential to demonstrating achievement of China’s Paris-Agreement pledge.
China’s ETS is designed as a tradable performance standard based on emissions indexed to 
physical output. It will cover organizations that consume more than 10,000 tons of coal-
equivalent energy or emit more than 20,000 tons of CO2 per year. Approximately 7,000 enter-
prises across the electric-power, energy-intensive-manufacturing, and civil-aviation sectors are 
expected to be covered when the system reaches full scale, accounting for approximately half 
of the nation’s CO2 emissions.
1 China’s Nationally Determined Contribution is available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Docu-
ments/China/1/China’s%20INDC%20-%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf.
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The tradable performance standard approach is intended to support implementation of national 
energy-saving and emissions-reduction goals at the enterprise level. Indexing emissions-reduc-
tion targets to physical output was chosen to mitigate the overall economic burden, while 
the opportunity to transfer emissions rights is designed to limit enterprises’ abatement costs. 
Given that a significant share of enterprises are quantifying their CO2 emissions for the first 
time, and many are still learning about abatement opportunities and costs, the cost effective-
ness of the system is likely to improve over time if these efforts are appropriately incentivized. 
The trading-system architecture is also expected to help regulators track and manage national 
energy use and CO2 emissions, in line with policy goals.
Ensuring data quality is critical
Reliable data on output-indexed emissions from covered enterprises are critical for a tradable-
performance standard to function. Systematically inaccurate, exaggerated, or falsified emis-
sions reductions would quickly render the system ineffective by displacing otherwise least-
cost-reduction opportunities, while compliant participants would be penalized. Obtaining 
energy, emissions, and physical output data of sufficient quality from covered enterprises has 
proven to be a major challenge in China. Wide variation across regions in China in per-capita 
wealth and economic composition lead to divergent priorities within the regulatory bodies 
of regional governments. This influences the level of familiarity with energy and emissions 
accounting standards as well as the capabilities and commitment of the state to enforce them.
Pilot CO2 ETSs in China have demonstrated strategies for establishing high-quality data 
systems. For instance, the Beijing CO2 pilot ETS required government-certified, independent 
third parties to evaluate the quality of enterprise compliance data. An additional round of 
external review was then required for a subset of the third-party audits. Governments admin-
istering the pilot systems funded independent verification, reducing the potential for conflicts 
of interest between covered enterprises and verifiers.
At the outset, awareness of accounting principles among enterprises was relatively low and 
uneven. China’s system additionally requires accurate estimates of a firm’s annual output, 
which is commercially sensitive information for many firms and difficult to verify without real-
time monitoring. A robust data system requires several reporting cycles to establish; further 
accelerating this process can undermine the organizational learning required to develop an 
effective and durable system.
Evaluating foundations in tandem with policy
Efforts within China to resolve data-quality issues prior to system launch are essential. 
Central-government architects of China’s ETS are deeply concerned about data-quality issues. 
As a result, the system may launch trading in one or a few sectors at a time, with the first 
sectors expected to be electric power, cement, and aluminum smelting. Emissions-abatement 
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potential and costs in these sectors are relatively well understood, as production processes and 
products are highly comparable across enterprises. The difficulty of verifying emissions—and 
thus the strength of incentives to displace least-cost with fictitious abatement—varies across 
sectors. This should be a major consideration in deciding whether to launch trading in a sector 
or to delay and invest first in improving data-verification capabilities.
The national ETS in China illustrates the importance of considering what foundations are 
needed for climate policy to work as intended. That the architects of China’s ETS have made 
rollout contingent on a strong data foundation is very encouraging. Other developing coun-
tries will face similar challenges in developing comprehensive energy and emissions invento-
ries capable of supporting ETS operation. Beyond emissions trading, there may be value in 
evaluating and strengthening energy and emissions accounting as a complement to regular 
stock-taking of policy pledges in the international arena. This additional focus would ensure 
that mismatches between policy pledges and enabling conditions are more quickly identified, 
as the latter will ultimately affect the achievement of mitigation goals.
Attention to the readiness of enterprises and governance systems to track data accurately for 
compliance purposes will be critical to the success of emissions trading in China as well as in 
other countries. Establishing rigorous and transparent emissions accounting has the added 
benefit of preparing national systems for international linkage, as the credibility of the actions 
taken by distant parties grows even more important in this context.

HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS » 87
China’s National CO2 Emissions Trading Program: A New 
Application of Tradable Performance Standards
Richard D. Morgenstern 
Resources for the Future
Key Points
•	 China’s new national CO2 trading program, scheduled to begin in late 
2017, differs in key respects from most programs operating in the West.
•	 An important design difference is the use of intensity- or rate-based trad-
able performance standards (TPS). Because these standards fix average 
rather than total emissions, they differ from more familiar command-and-
control or cap-and-trade mechanisms.
•	 This approach has obvious advantages in terms of adapting to economic 
changes, but it is also inherently more complex to administer.
•	 Critical implementation issues include allowance allocation, the division 
of responsibilities among different Chinese authorities, actual measure-
ment and verification of emissions and output, and the setting/adjusting of 
sector-specific benchmarks.
•	 Given these challenges, and given China’s decentralized environmental 
management framework and lack of a strong tradition of national data 
collection, it will be important to strengthen systems for third-party verifi-
cation, include incentives for accurate reporting, and provide for periodic 
program review and the flexibility to make modifications.
Introduction
China’s national CO2 emissions trading program — scheduled to begin in late 2017 — differs 
in key respects from most programs operating in the West. Some of the design differences 
are clearly tied to reliance on administered rather than market prices in key sectors, the wide 
variation in incomes, and differences in the local economies across Chinese provinces.
This essay focuses on the tradable performance standard that drives China’s new national 
program.1 I begin with a short discussion of tradable performance standards (TPS), an inten-
sity- or rate-based mechanism that fixes average emissions. I describe how these standards differ 
from both traditional regulation (“command and control”) and from the more commonly 
1 A broader set of issues associated with China’s new national program is discussed in Goulder, et al. (2017). See also brief by Goul-
der in this volume.
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used form of emissions trading, namely, cap and trade, which fixes total as opposed to average 
emissions. I then turn to some of the unique design characteristics of the Chinese program. 
Finally, I offer summary observations about the implementation of a TPS in China.
Tradable performance standard vs. cap and trade
Tradable performance standards combine elements of traditional regulation with market-
oriented mechanisms. Just as under traditional regulation, tradable standards require the 
government to set a maximum amount of emissions allowed per unit of output for covered 
sources in the regulated sector (e.g., tons of emissions per kilowatt hour generated, in the case 
of the electricity sector). The standard may vary by the technology/fuel used (e.g., coal vs. 
natural gas), but need not do so. Instead of requiring each source to independently meet the 
requirement (as would be the case for a command-and-control approach), underperforming 
sources can purchase credits from those that outperform, such that the standard is achieved 
on average across the entire group.
A key attraction of issuing allowances based on the ratio of emissions to actual output is that 
the system can more easily adapt to economic changes. If the economy is booming (high 
output), the allowable level of emissions increases. Conversely, when the economy is in a 
slump (low output) fewer emissions are allowed. A disadvantage, as Fischer (2005) has shown, 
is that a TPS can generate an implicit subsidy to output, which may increase total emissions. 
Further, to assure program integrity, regulators charged with making compliance determina-
tions in a TPS system face the challenge of obtaining reliable information on both emissions 
and output, not simply on emissions, as in a cap-and-trade system.
The canonical example of a TPS is the approach used by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to phase out lead in gasoline in the mid-1980s, which also included provisions 
for emissions banking. A similar TPS mechanism was the preferred option under the EPA’s 
2016 Clean Power Plan to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants.
2
The lead phasedown program is widely seen as an effective and efficient means of reducing the 
lead content of gasoline. Retrospective analysis has shown that the market-based nature of the 
program, including the banking provisions, provided incentives for more efficient adoption 
of new lead-removing technology, relative to a uniform standard. In a review of the program, 
Newell and Rodgers (2006) explain that: “…expected permit sellers (i.e., low-cost refineries) 
significantly increased their likelihood of [technology] adoption relative to expected permit 
buyers (i.e., high-cost refineries)…compared to under individually binding performance stan-
dards.”
2 This regulation is currently being revised by the Trump Administration.
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Overall, Newell and Rodgers found that transaction costs were relatively modest, reducing the 
efficiency of the program by about 10 percent. At the same time, they concluded that the flex-
ibility introduced by the TPS increased the likelihood of both intentional and unintentional 
violations, especially on the part of smaller refiners and fuel blenders. This placed additional 
administrative burdens on the EPA’s monitoring and enforcement staffs. The most common 
violations involved the quantities of lead used and the volumes of gasoline produced and 
imported.
China’s approach to tradable performance standards
China initially announced that large emitters in six major sectors would participate in the new 
national trading program. Subsequently, the number of sectors was reduced to three: electric 
power, aluminum, and cement. At this writing, there is discussion of further limiting the 
initial program to the electric power sector only.
Allowance allocation in the Chinese program occurs in two phases within each annual compli-
ance period. At the beginning of the period, a covered firm receives a number of allowances 
equal to its output from the previous compliance period multiplied by the sector’s benchmark 
emissions-output ratio, and adjusted by an initial allocation factor. As noted, for the electric 
sector, the benchmark emissions-output ratio is denoted in terms of tons per kilowatt hour. 
Although the actual benchmark emissions-output ratio(s) have not yet been announced, the 
initial allocation factor is expected to be about 60 percent.
At or near the end of the compliance period, a covered firm receives the additional allowances 
needed to bring the ratio of total allowances to end-of-period output in conformity with the 
mandated sector-specific benchmark emissions-output ratio. Depending on the firm’s actual 
output for the year, there may be few additional allowances awarded at this later stage. In 
principle, firms could even be required to return some of their initially allocated allowances, 
although with the 60 percent ratio that seems unlikely. Firms that emit at a rate higher than 
the performance standard must abate emissions and/or purchase allowances, while companies 
that emit at a rate below the standard can sell their surplus allowances. Trading of allowances 
is allowed both within and across provinces, although there is concern that the latter may be 
limited for reasons of political economy.
As with the U.S. lead phasedown program, the compliance obligation in China’s system is 
defined in terms of an emissions-output ratio, not the absolute level of emissions.3 A distin-
guishing feature of China’s program is the two-step, within-period allowance-allocation proce-
3 Recent discussions among the nationwide program designers indicate that, at a later point, when the system’s coverage is 
expanded, a traditional cap-and-trade program (rather than a TPS) might apply to some of the added sectors. That is, the number 
of allowances awarded to companies in these sectors could be fixed in each compliance period rather than being tied to the level of 
output at the end of the compliance period.
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dure, where the second step involves end-of-period updating.4 The need to almost simulta-
neously assemble and verify information on both emissions and output may make it more 
difficult to determine compliance, a problem that may be magnified for sectors that produce 
multiple products or even for the electric sector if multiple benchmarks are used.
One of the key issues in implementing the program involves the division of responsibilities 
among different Chinese authorities. While the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC) is tasked with determining sector-specific emission-output benchmark ratios 
and allocation methodologies, the provinces will be responsible for providing the necessary 
data to the NDRC and distributing allowances to firms based on the established methodolo-
gies.5
Another key issue involves the actual measurement of emissions and output. As in the lead 
phasedown program, reliable information on both metrics is critical to the integrity of the 
system. China aims to address the reliability issue by enlisting third-party verifiers to review 
company reports on emissions and output. However, at this writing, the verifier certification 
process is not fully established and the incentives for accurate reporting are in question. Even 
if these issues are resolved, it is not clear there will be a sufficient number of verifiers to review 
all covered companies’ reports within the relatively short reporting window and at a reason-
able cost.
In concert with provincial officials, the national government is working to further define 
program specifics. At this writing the open design issues include: 1) what level of ambition 
to apply in setting the sector-specific benchmark emissions-output ratios; 2) whether to offer 
unique benchmarks for different fuels and/or production processes; 3) how to adjust bench-
marks over time and via what process; 4) what methodologies to use for sectors not readily 
amenable to benchmarks; 5) how to update allowance distributions to reflect actual produc-
tion levels during the compliance period; and 6) whether provinces that expand coverage of 
the program will receive incremental allowances for the additional covered firms.
Conclusion
In establishing a national emissions trading system, China is clearly taking another “leap 
forward.” Reliance on a TPS mechanism with emissions banking provisions has obvious advan-
tages, especially the ability to adapt to economic changes. At the same time, the operation 
of such a system is inherently more complex. As the experience of the U.S. lead phasedown 
demonstrates, even in a more developed country with a well-developed legal and administra-
tive system, the data requirements for implementing a TPS with banking impose additional 
4 EPA’s lead phasedown rules allowed a true-up period for firms to trade allowances.
5 Provincial governments will have the option of lowering benchmarks (i.e., reducing allocations) for specific sectors, but must 
receive approval from the NDRC to do so.
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burdens on both regulators and industry, especially for the measurement, reporting, and veri-
fication of emissions and output. The highly decentralized nature of the Chinese environmen-
tal management system and the absence of a strong tradition of national data collection are 
specific issues of concern.
Going forward, China would be well advised to strengthen the system for third-party veri-
fication and assure there are strong incentives for the verifiers to report accurately. It is also 
important to provide for periodic review of the program and to build in the flexibility to make 
constructive modifications when new information reveals program weaknesses.
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Linking China’s Cap-and-Trade System with Other Systems: 
Key Challenges
Lawrence H. Goulder 
Stanford University
Key Points
•	 China is introducing what will be the world’s largest emissions trading 
system (ETS).
•	 This ETS will take the form of a tradable performance standard, a structure 
that is different from most other national or regional ETSs.
•	 Despite the structural difference, there is potential for mutually beneficial 
gains from introducing trades of China-sourced emissions allowances on 
the international market.
•	 Linking China’s ETS with other ETSs would not be beneficial in the short 
term, however. Before the potential gains from linkage can be realized, it 
would be necessary to:
•	 improve the reliability of the data on China’s emissions reductions;
•	 achieve greater compliance;
•	 assure a level of policy stringency comparable to what is promoted in 
other countries.
China’s forthcoming national ETS
China is embarking on the introduction of a nationwide CO2 ETS. Once fully implemented, 
the national program will become the world’s largest ETS, increasing by over 50 percent 
the global coverage of CO2 under such programs. Initially covering the power, cement, and 
aluminum sectors, it will eventually expand to other sectors and embrace approximately 7,000 
companies. Under current plans, the facilities covered by the program will eventually account 
for over half of China’s GHG emissions. The program is expected to contribute significantly 
toward China’s pledge under the Paris Agreement of a 60–65 percent reduction in CO2 emis-
sions by 2030.1 The national ETS focuses exclusively on emissions associated with production 
by domestic firms. The emissions embodied in imported goods or services are not covered.
1 China’s Nationally Determined Contribution is available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Docu-
ments/China/1/China’s%20INDC%20-%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf.
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China’s ETS will take the form of a tradable emissions standard. Under this approach, which 
has previously been used, for example, in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s phase-
down of leaded gasoline in the 1980s, allowances are allocated to firms based on sector bench-
marks for maximum emissions-output ratios. If a firm’s emissions would yield an emissions-
output ratio in excess of its benchmark, it must purchase additional allowances to offset the 
excess; if a firm’s emissions would give rise to a ratio below the benchmark, it can sell its excess 
allowances.2
Would international linkage be beneficial?
In principle, linking China’s national ETS with ETSs or other types of emissions-reduction 
policies in other countries could yield social benefits to China and other countries. Linking 
China’s ETS with other ETSs, in particular, would bring about international trades of emis-
sions allowances among firms (sources), thereby causing emissions reductions to take place 
where they can be achieved at least cost. Purchasers would gain by obtaining allowances at 
a lower price than otherwise would be possible, while sellers would enjoy a new source of 
revenues above the cost of the additional required abatement implied by such sales. In theory, 
linkage can thereby reduce the global cost of achieving given global reductions in CO2.
Notably, the structure of China’s ETS — a tradeable performance standard — differs from 
that of most other national or regional ETSs. This structural difference does not prevent 
potential gains from linkage. In China and the nations to which the China system is linked, 
firms will wish to buy or sell allowances on the international market, and resulting trades 
would be mutually beneficial.
At the same time, aspects of China’s ETS itself suggest that it might not reduce emissions in 
the most cost-effective way. The tradable performance standard implicitly gives a subsidy to 
output, since an increase in output helps meet the standard by lowering a firm’s emissions-
output ratio. This means that even if the prescribed emissions-output ratios (the benchmarks) 
are set optimally, the resulting costs per ton of emissions reduction will be higher than the 
costs of achieving the same reductions under a conventional cap-and-trade (or carbon tax) 
system. While this suggests a limitation in the cost-effectiveness of China’s ETS, it does not 
deny the benefits of international linkage. Establishing linkage still lowers costs, and China 
and its trading partners would be better off with allowance trades than without them.
Steps needed to allow the benefits from linkage to materialize
The potential benefits from linkage would not materialize, however, until China overcomes 
some significant limitations in its current ETS program.
2 For details on the nature of China’s tradable performance standard, see Duan and Zhou (forthcoming) and Goulder, et al. (forth-
coming). See also brief by Morgenstern in this volume.
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Improve the reliability of information on emissions reductions
A needed step is to achieve strong MRV, enforcement, and compliance under China’s ETS. 
Because of the intensity-based design of the ETS, the government will have to collect data 
on emissions and on the levels of industrial output (including inventories) and electricity 
consumption. In the country’s pilot ETS programs (introduced in 2013), such data were 
apparently subject to manipulation by private firms (Lo 2016; Wang 2013) and local govern-
ments (Ghanem and Zhang 2014; Liu, et al. 2015). Under the national ETS, provincial 
governments will be responsible for MRV and compliance. But some of the provinces have 
limited resources for carrying out these functions.
Until the reliability of the emissions information is much improved, declared emissions reduc-
tions are likely to fall considerably short of actual reductions. This means that if entities in 
China were to sell allowances on an international market, the associated increases in foreign 
emissions would not be matched by actual reductions in China. Allowances would be traded 
at prices that do not reflect true marginal abatement costs, since less abatement would be 
carried out than appeared to be the case. Rather than equalize marginal abatement costs 
internationally, the true abatement costs in China would be higher than what the market 
suggested; hence, the potential for international trades to improve cost-effectiveness would be 
compromised — and possibly lost entirely. A precondition for effective linkage is overcoming 
weaknesses in MRV, compliance, and enforcement.
Assure a level of policy stringency comparable to that of other countries
Current plans call for relatively lax benchmarks in the early stages of China’s national ETS. 
This, combined with lack of reliability in emissions-reduction data, suggests that initially the 
effective cap on allowances would be lax from an efficiency point of view. China’s allowance 
prices could be quite low at the outset — lower than the prices in ETSs elsewhere. Under these 
conditions, if China were to link its system with other ETSs, it would become a major seller 
of allowances on the international market.
Difficulties would arise if China’s program were far less stringent than that of other ETS 
programs. Differences in stringency per se do not eliminate the potential of linkage to bring 
about greater cost-effectiveness. However, such differences raise distributional issues and asso-
ciated issues of fairness. If China’s program were much less stringent, linkage would bring 
about a significant transfer of wealth from other nations to China, corresponding to the 
purchase of Chinese-sourced allowances. Although this would benefit China, interested 
parties in other countries might view this as inequitable because of both the magnitude of the 
wealth transfer and the fact that it implies much less abatement and correspondingly much 
more local pollution in the other countries. This issue applies even if the above-mentioned 
problem of phantom reductions were overcome.
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Greater stringency of China’s program can be brought about through a tightening of the 
benchmark emissions-output ratios or through implementation of an allowance price floor, 
with a floor price comparable to global allowance prices. Achieving beneficial results from 
international linkage would seem to require one of these adjustment as China’s system evolves 
over time.
Conclusions
Linking China’s ETS with the ETSs in other countries has the potential to confer significant 
benefits to China and to the jurisdictions with which China’s system is linked. This is the 
case despite the very different structure of China’s ETS relative to most other ETSs. However, 
before these benefits can be fully realized, some improvements to China’s system must be 
achieved. These include improving the reliability of the data on China’s emissions reductions, 
achieving greater compliance, and assuring a level of policy stringency comparable to what is 
promoted in other countries.
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Forming a Northeast Asian Carbon Market under the Paris 
Agreement
Suh-Yong Chung 
Korea University
Key Points
•	 To develop a Northeast Asian Carbon Market, leaders in the region must 
build strong political momentum for their national climate-change agen-
das. This is possible if the formation of a carbon market is seen as a policy 
vehicle for developing major low-carbon projects, such as a regional super-
grid.
•	 In establishing a carbon market for Northeast Asia, it will be very impor-
tant to consider and reflect on the development of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, including the cooperative approaches of Article 6.2 and the 
Mechanism of Article 6.4.
•	 Domestic carbon markets in Northeast Asia are at different levels of devel-
opment. Therefore, flexibility in terms of participating stakeholders, market 
structure, and accounting rules is necessary to develop a carbon market at 
the regional level, as long as the regional market is compatible with Article 
6 of the Paris Agreement.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
The future of carbon markets will be shaped by the development of the Article 6 regime 
under the Paris Agreement. Current negotiations on Article 6 have left a number of issues 
unresolved, and there is still room for adjustment on several options regarding the forms these 
carbon markets might take. At this stage, the Paris Agreement envisions various types of offset 
mechanisms under Article 6.4. The scope of these offset mechanisms will expand from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (Kyoto-Protocol mecha-
nisms), and Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) to new types of mechanisms that are 
likely to emerge in the future. Article 6.2 focuses on the accounting rules that will govern 
issues related to the transfer of mitigation outcomes. Under the Paris Agreement, mitigation 
outcomes can be internationally transferred between or among different national or regional 
jurisdictions.
Article 6 does not directly deal with the linking of emission trading systems (ETSs), although 
Article 6.2 may partially address linkage issues in the context of accounting rules, sustainable 
development, and environment integrity. Emissions trading has been used as a mechanism 
to implement domestic climate policies, and existing systems are not necessarily designed to 
98 « MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT
facilitate transnational implementation of climate policies at this stage. The European Union 
(EU) ETS can be seen as a compliance mechanism for one Party/jurisdiction (the EU) under 
the UNFCCC. Thus, linking trading systems between the EU and Switzerland could be seen 
as a way of facilitating cooperation between different jurisdictions.
Status of carbon markets in Northeast Asia
Currently, carbon markets in Northeast Asia are in different stages of development in different 
jurisdictions.
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea, which launched its national ETS in 2015, has developed the most 
advanced form of carbon market at the national level in Northeast Asia. As of August 2017, 
Korea has completed the first phase of its national ETS and is about to start the implementa-
tion of its second phase. The first phase covered 525 large emitters, 68 percent of total emis-
sions, and 23 sectors, including steel, cement, petro-chemicals, refineries, power generators, 
buildings, waste, and aviation. Under the country’s new administration, the second phase is 
expected to focus more on the following issues, very likely leading to changes in the gover-
nance of the ETS:
•	 Low-carbon innovation and increased environmentally-friendly invest-
ment;
•	 Cost-effective and flexible measures to reduce GHGs;
•	 Achievement of the national GHG reduction target; and
•	 Active participation in global carbon markets.
Finally, it is important to note that the Republic of Korea’s Nationally Determined Contribu-
tion (NDC) calls for reducing GHG emissions by 11.3 percent relative to business-as-usual 
in 2030.1 This creates another policy driver for Korea’s active participation in international 
carbon markets and other cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
Japan
Japan has developed various market-based mechanisms, both domestically and internation-
ally. Japan’s Voluntary Emission Trading System has been in place since 2005. Japan has also 
promoted advanced technologies through its Advanced Technologies Promotion Subsidy 
Scheme with Emission Reduction Targets (ASSET) and J-Credit System.
1 Korea’s NDC is at: http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Republic%20of%20Korea/1/
INDC%20Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf.
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At the municipal level, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has launched a cap-and-trade 
system that covers emissions from approximately 1,400 large-scale facilities, including 
commercial and industrial buildings and factories. By implementing various domestic market 
mechanisms, Japan has developed capacities relevant for implementing MRV and trading 
registries.
One important component of Japanese climate-change policy is the JCM. The JCM is imple-
mented bilaterally with 16 partner countries through a joint committee that includes repre-
sentatives of relevant ministries and high-level officials from participating governments. JCM 
implementation has involved a variety of programs and projects, including those developed by 
government agencies as well as efforts undertaken by Japanese and foreign firms, and a vari-
ety of sectors, such as electricity production and distribution, transportation, industry, and 
waste management. As of 2016, 23 JCM methodologies in five sectors have been approved. 
Outcomes of JCM implementation can be shared between countries that develop registries 
and can be used toward Japan’s or host countries’ NDCs. To promote JCM, Japan has been 
active in the development of related rules as part of negotiations over Article 6.
China
China is expected to introduce its own nation-wide ETS later in 2017, building on ten years 
of experience with trading through the CDM and several sub-national ETS pilots covering 
five cities and two provinces. Each ETS pilot jurisdiction has implemented its own ETS, 
resulting in different levels of emission-reduction targets, emissions-compliance thresholds, 
cap coverage, baseline years, and other design features. Seven pilot ETSs have made progress 
in the MRV process largely due to the influence of China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission and with external assistance, such as from the World Bank’s Partnership for 
Market Readiness.
Once China introduces its nation-wide ETS, the size of its carbon market will be much greater 
than that of the EU, which is currently the largest in the world. The scale of China’s trading 
system has the potential to reshape world carbon markets by influencing existing and future 
market mechanisms. However, China may not immediately pursue international cooperative 
initiatives by, for example, linking its national ETS with others (such as Korea’s) or actively 
engaging in developing the rule book for Article 6. Rather, China is likely to spend several 
additional years preparing for participation in international markets by ensuring domestic 
ETS compliance, advancing its domestic MRV, ensuring appropriate ETS coverage, and align-
ing with other national climate policies.
Elements of developing a carbon market for Northeast Asia
Voluntary cooperation by three Northeast Asian countries to develop a regional carbon club 
(i.e., Northeast Asian Carbon Market) will surely contribute to global efforts to reduce GHG 
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emissions. Even though China, Japan, and Korea have developed individual market mecha-
nisms, several important elements need to be addressed to establish a regional carbon market. 
These include building political momentum, creating shared interests, securing broad partici-
pation, and ensuring compatibility with the Paris Agreement.
Building Political Momentum: Northeast Asia is one of the most difficult regions in the 
world for developing regional cooperative institutions, due to its unique geopolitical situa-
tion. In the past, history, traditional security concerns, and other political issues have often 
prevented neighboring countries from developing regional mechanisms. To succeed, leaders in 
these countries will need to build enough political momentum to place the development of a 
regional carbon market at the top of their respective national agendas.
Creating Shared Interests: Carbon clubs can be created only when there exist shared interests 
among stakeholders. In Northeast Asia, the formation of a carbon market should be seen as a 
policy vehicle for developing and implementing region-wide low-carbon projects. For exam-
ple, the carbon market must be designed to mobilize financial and technological resources to 
boost major renewable projects in the region so that participating countries and other stake-
holders can achieve development while substantially reducing GHG emissions.
Securing Broad Participation: Membership in a Northeast Asian Carbon Market must 
be flexible. In addition to China, Japan, and Korea, other countries in the region, such as 
Mongolia and North Korea, could be candidates for participation. Other interested countries 
and international organizations, such as the World Bank and Global Green Growth Institute, 
could also be considered as future candidates.
Ensuring Compatibility with the Paris Agreement: A Northeast Asian Carbon Market will 
need to comply with rules under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, including rules for common 
accounting (MRV) and other mechanism(s).
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